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KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
\ t t o r n e y s for Respondents
City C e n t r e I , #330
175 E a s t 400 S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111-2314
Telephone:
( 8 0 1 ) 521-3773

//,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN L. BLACK,
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 930381
NAYER HONARVAR, STEPHEN L.
TROST, H. JAMES CLEGG,
PRESIDENT, and UTAH STATE BAR,
Respondents.

Respondents hereby respond to the Petition for Extraordinary Writ as follows:
FIRST RESPONSE
Petitioner fails to state an appropriate claim for
relief under circumstances where no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy is available.

PP »NO CHHISTIAN. PC
A T T O H N f t » AT LAW
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SECOND RESPONSE
1. Respondents admit Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(2) provides
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs.
2.

Respondents deny

the allegations contained in

Paragraph B on page 1 stating that the Respondents have "exceeded
their jurisdiction or abused their discretion."

Respondents, in

this instance as in all disciplinary matters, have acted in
accordance with the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar
(POD) promulgated by the Supreme Court on 7/1/87.
3.

Respondents admit the allegations contained in

Paragraph C, Page 1 of the petition.
4.

Respondents

deny the allegations

Paragraph D, Page 1 of the petition.

contained in

See the Respondents' answer

to Paragraph 2 above.
5.

Respondents admit that John Black is a resident of

Utah and a member of the Utah State Bar since 1952.
6.

Respondents admit the allegations contained in

Paragraph B on Page 2 of the petition.
7.

Respondents admit the allegations contained in

Paragraphs C, D, and E on Page 2 of the petition.
8.

Respondents deny the factual allegations contained

in "Petitioner's Statement of Issues," Paragraphs A, B, C, and D
on Page 3 .
9.

Respondents admit with reference to Paragraph A,

Page 4 that (a) a hearing panel entered Findings, Conclusions, and
-2KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN. PC
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a Recommendation on 6/18/93, (b) following the procedure of Rule
XII(e) POD the Board reviewed the same on 6/24/93 and a copy of
the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation and Order Affirming
on Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel
was forwarded to Mr. Black's counsel the following Tuesday,
6/29/93, by certified mail, (c) Mr. Black was found to have
violated Rules 8.4(c) and 1.13(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct

(RPC), (d) Mr. Black's counsel filed a Petition for

Reconsideration on 7/9/93 knowing that the POD Rule XII(f) was
abolished on June 30, 1993, and (e) the Respondent Trost filed a
Motion

for Clarification on 7/19/93

with this Court seeking

appropriate guidance.
10.

Respondents deny the allegations contained in

Paragraph B on Page 5 of the petition and affirmatively state that
the lien language directly above John Black's signature speaks for
itself and determines the extent of Black's obligation.
11. Respondents admit the "Procedural History" of events
contained in Paragraph C of Page 6 and deny the balance of said
paragraph and affirmatively state that Respondent's counsel never
objected nor requested a continuance of the trial for lack of time
to prepare a defense or for any other reason.
12.

Respondents deny

the

allegations

Paragraph D on Page 7 of the petition.

contained

in

The case in chief was

generally based upon the evidence that the Office of Attorney
Discipline (formerly known as the Office of Bar Counsel) introduced, admissions in the pleadings, and stipulations between the

-3K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN. PC.
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parties. Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondents can precisely
refer to what transpired at the trial because neither the record
not the transcript are available at this time.
13. Respondents deny that no final order has been
entered as alleged on Page 8 of the petition entitled "STATEMENT
OF REASONS WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS."
The appropriate course of action asserted by the Office of
Attorney Discipline is an appeal wherein both parties can brief
the issues, cite to the record and cite to a transcript.
14. Respondents, referring to the "STATEMENT OF REASONS
WHY IT IS IMPRACTICAL OR INAPPROPRIATE TO PETITION THE DISTRICT
COURT," p. 9, admit that the district court lacks jurisdiction in
that a trial on the merits has occurred and errors are alleged
that should be briefed and heard by this Court.
15. Respondents have submitted a Memorandum Supporting
Response to Petition for Extraordinary Writ and in opposition to
Respondent's "MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION," p. 9., but as to specific factual allegations, responds
as follows:
a) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the
heading "Point I," appearing on Pages 10 through 17 of the
petition.
b) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the
heading "Point II," Pages 17 through 25 of the petition. The fact
is that John Black, in order to receive the diagnostic and
treatment report from Dr. C. M. Wilkerson, agreed to execute and
-4KtPP AND CHRISTIAN. PC.
ATTOffMCTS AT UAW
CITY CCNTWC X. # 3 3 0
173 CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH
SALT LAKC

CITY,

I return to Dr. Wilkerson the "lien."
medical

report,

settled

the

Thereafter, he received the

personal

injury

case with

the

insurance carrier, took his fees and costs, and remitted the
balance to his client without honoring the lien.

This was found

to be in violation of Rules 1.13(b) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.

To say that the conduct is simply a breach

of contract issue is both misstating the facts and contrary to the
conclusions of three adjudicative bodies, namely, the screening
panel, the hearing panel, and the Board of Bar Commissioners, and
as well as the weight of authority from other jurisdictions.1
c) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the
heading "Point III," Pages 25 through 30 of the petition.

With

respect to the outstanding amount, John Black, at trial, personally acknowledged the receipt of the billing statement from Dr.
Wilkerson in the amount of approximately $2,685.00. Subsequently
and for a short period of time, January through September of 1992,
Ms. Landers made a total payment of $220.00, leaving an outstanding balance of $2,465.00. The Hearing Panel, at its own discretion, recommended that John Black make a restitution payment of
$1,635.91, see copy of Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law &
Recommendation attached hereto as Exhibit "A." With reference to
1

Johnstone v. State Bar. 64 Cal. 2d 153 (1966) (when an
attorney receives money on behalf of a third party who is not his
client, he nevertheless is a fiduciary as to such third party.
Thus the funds in his possession are impressed with a trust and
his conversion of such funds is a breach of trust; Galardi v.
State Barr 43 Cal. 3d 683 (1987); Guzetta v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d
962 (1987); In Re Charles Rawson. New Mexico Sup. Ct. #15,897
(filed June 1, 1992); Alaska Bar Opinion 86-4 (1988); Arizona Bar
Opinion 88-2 (1988); Washington Formal Opinion #185
-5K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN PC
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the allegations of extortion, Pages 27 & 28 of the petition, Steve
Trost and Nayer Honarvar deny said allegations.

The recommenda-

tions of discipline and restitution were made initially by the
Screening Panel. The Screening Panels recommendation of Private
Reprimand was conditioned upon John Black making restitution
payment to Dr. Wilkerson.

The Screening Panel has traditionally

relied upon the authority of Rule I, IV(d), VII(h) and Rule
IX(d)(C) to fashion a sanction

in the best interest of the

complainant, the respondent, the administration of justice and the
standards of professional conduct.

(See Exhibit B.)

Black

rejected the Screening Panel's conditional offer of a Private
Reprimand and the matter was voted formal.

After the trial on

June 15, 1993, the Hearing Panel entered its Findings of Fact, and
Conclusions of Law and also Recommended that John Black make
restitution to Dr. Wilkerson. At no time during the investigation
and prosecution of the Black case did Steve Tropt or Nayer
Honarvar make any demand for restitution from John Black or impose
any sanction on him.
d) Respondents deny the allegations contained under the
heading "Point IV,H Pages 30 through 34 of the petition.

The

allegations that Nayer Honarvar and Steve Trost acted in bad faith
are wholly unfounded.

Respondents, upon receiving the letter of

complaint from Dr. Wilkerson, simply engaged in the investigation
and

prosecution

of

Professional Conduct.

the alleged

the Rules of

Their conduct falls squarely within the

procedures of discipline.
-6K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN PC
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violations of

^) Respondents deny any award of attorney fees is
appropriate since the actions taken by the Respondents were
pursuant tQ the Procedures of Discipline and accordingly, the
Respondent^ are immune pursuant to Rule XVI POD and the reasoning
dvitf h&2dln$

0f

BaHer

r. Utah State

Bar. 205 Utah Adv. Reg 3 (SC,

1/20/93).
WHEREFORE, Respondents request the Court dismiss the
Petition fc*r Extraordinary Writ for the above-stated reasons and
for those Reasons explained in the Supporting Memorandum of Law
which accompanies this response.
£>ATED this /3'* day of August, 1993.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY il£<^AN&SRS, ESQ.
Attorneys for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
} HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /3 rt day of August, 1993,
I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
barker M. Nielson, Esq. #2413
$55 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

BA*\BLACX\PU
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SALT LAKC CITY,

to be

NAYER H. HONARVAR, #5484
Assistant Bar Counsel
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL
645 S. 200 E.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-531-9110

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
Disciplinary Hearing Panel:
Robert S. Howell, Chair
Sandra L. Sjogren
Stanley B. Bonham

In the Matter of the
Complaint by

against

i
i
I
i

JOHN L. BLACK
DOB: 8-25-23
ADM: 6-12-52

1
]
]

C. M. WILKERSON

ORDER AFFIRMING
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
F-557

Pursuant to Rule XII(e) of the Procedures of Discipline,
the Board has reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Recommendation
Hearing Panel.
Counsel

the

of Discipline of the Disciplinary

Upon the recommendation of the Office of Bar

Public

Reprimand

be

reduced

to

a

Private

Reprimand, the Board hereby recommends that for violating
Rules 8.4(c), Misconduct; and 1.13(b), Safekeeping Property,
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar,
the Respondent be ordered as follows:

Exhibit "B"

8

1.
the

Respondent make restitution to C. M, Wilkerson in

amount

of

$1,635.91

or

the outstanding

balance of

Wilkerson's bill, whichever is less within thirty (30) days
from the entry of the final order by the Supreme Court; and
2•

Respondent be Publicly Reprimanded.

DATED this

£ ^'^

day of j ^ t ^ -

1993.

BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS

By:
H.'Ja^es Clegg
Presxdent-Elect

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed to Parker M. Nielson, Attorney at
Law at £55 South 200 East, S.L.C., UT 84111 on this ^^
day
of
<=4(J^ f
1993.
~
,

9

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
COMPLAINT BY:

]
]

C M . WILKERSON

CERTIFICATE OF READINESS
FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW

AGAINST

]i
1
]

JOHN L. BLACK
DOB:
08-25-23
ADM:
06-12-52

]i
]
;

F-55?

COMES NOW, John C. Baldwin, Executive Director of the Utah State Bar and hereby
certifies that the Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand and Recomendation of the Order of
Discipline was approved by H. James Clegg, President of the Board of Bar Commissioners of
the Utah Stale Bar on June 24, 1993, and that Respondent has not filed a Petition for
Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration as required by Rule XII (0DATED this

/f)tt

day of

mr^JLtA

1993.

John C. Baldwin
Executive Director

370
Exhibit

"C"
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Utah §tate Bar
Office of Bar Counsel
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 3834
Telephone (801) 531-9110 • FAX (801) 531-0660 • WATS 1 800-698-9077

June 1, 1993

Parker Nielson
Attorney at Law
655 S. 200 E.
S.L.C., UT 84111
RE:

Formal Complaint F-557 against John Black

Dear Mr. Nielson:
Enclosed please find a copy of a minute entry by the
Utah Supreme Court adopting new procedural rules for
disciplinary cases. A copy of those rules are enclosed for
your convenience.
Please note that hearing panels will cease to exist as
of June 30, 1993. All formal cases will be transferred to
the district court with proper venue as of July 1, 1993.
Accordingly, there is a narrow window of opportunity to
settle your case. The Bar Commission will conduct their
final review of proposed disciplines by consent on June 25
which provides enough time to have the same to the Supreme
Court by June 30. Thereafter the Bar Commission will no
longer be involved in any way with discipline.
In order to provide a reasonable amount of time for
each Bar Commissioner to review the proposed disciplines by
consent prior to their meeting on June 25, the same must be
signed by June 18.
If you would like to seriously discuss a discipline by
consent, please call me at your earliest possible
convenience.
Sincerely,
'wayer H. Honarvar
Assistant Bar Counsel
NHH:clf
Enclosures
2079

Exhibit "D"

Utah^tateBar
Office of Bar Counsel
*M5 South ?00 East. Suite 205 • Sail i.akt? Cuy Utah 84111 -383*
Telepnone (801> 531-9110 • rAX (80!) 5310660 • WATS 1-800-G90-9077

M E M O R A N D U M

TO:

Penny S. Brooke, Maureen I*. Cleary, Charles H.
Thronson, Elliot J. Williams, Daniel W. Hindert,
Dennis V. Haslam, Randy L. Dryer, Brent Wilcox
(UTLA), Elizabeth Conley, Richard Dibblee and Jtohn
C.

Baldwin

FROM:

Stephen A. Trost, Bar Counsel

DATE:

April 27, 1993

RE:

Proposed Interprofessional Code, Third Edition,
Dated February 4, 1993

On April 22, 199 3 the Bar Commission reviewed the
Third Edition of the Interprofessional Code. I pointed but
to
the
Commission
that
Section
IX(E),
entitled
"Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges," coiild
be improved by (1) a further explanation of the ethical
responsibilities of an attorney regarding a client's
medical expenses, and (2) an explanation of an attorneys
duties when a medical lien is being asserted by a provider.
Attached as Exhibit 1 please find a copy of the original
section with additions noted in brackets*
The Rules of Professional Conduct specifically provide
in Rule 1.8(e)(1) and (2) that a lawyer may advance court
costs and expenses of litigation contingent upon the
outcome of the case and for indigent clients the same may
be provided whether or not the retainer agreement requites
repayment• Therefore, I have included additional language
to the first sentence of Section IX(E) referencing this
rule.
The more substantive addition concerns medical liens.
This office frequently reviews claims by providers that an
attorney has breached the Rules of Professional Conduct,
specifically Rule 8.4(c), by ignoring a medical lien
executed by the client and the provider and distributing
the proceeds of a settlement or judgment directly to the
client, or even worse, being a signatory of the lien and
distributing funds without regard thereto.
1;
Exhibit "E"

tJo'oi 551 <)66K)

UTAH

J7AT£ DAK

It occurs to me that by simply adding a short thjird
paragraph to Section I X ( E ) / as indicated in Exhibit 1,
could help alleviate conflict and tension in this area.
The Bar Commission suggested that I contact the aboyereferenced individuals for their perspective on my proposal
and, accordingly, I would welcome your thoughts.
Please
give me a call or forward your comments before May 3, 1993,
since the full Legal/Health Care Committee is meeting May
4, 1993 to discuss any proposals for amendments and to
adopt a final version of the same.
Thank you for your cooperation.

1973

13

INTERPROFESSIONAL CODE
E.

Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges

An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts, medical or
otherwise, incurred by a client (except as provided in Rule 1.8(e)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct]. However, where the attorney
contracts for services on behalf of his/her client, which expenses
are necessary to the proper preparation and presentation of the
client's case, the attorney should expect to make payments for the
services.

Therefore, while the attorney should not (and othioa-Lly

oannot-j pay for or guarantee payment of medical services rendered
to the client

[except where obligated by a medical lien], the

attorney should pay directly for medical reports, conferences with
physicians, time spent in depositions or in court, and look to the
attorney's

client

for reimbursement of these costs which the

attorney has advanced on behalf of the client.

The physician should bill the patient and not the attorney for
medical care rendered to the patient.

The physician should bill

the attorney for services rendered on behalf of the patient at the
attorney's request. The attorney should pay these amounts promptly
and

as they are billed, and should

not wait the outcome of

litigation before paying the same.

(Where the attorney is directed not to honor, in whole or in
part, an otherwise lawful medical lien, an attorney shall either
(1) hold in trust sufficient funds from the proceeds to pay off the
lien and expeditiously pay the same upon receipt of a written

authorization executed by the client and the provider, or (2)
interplead sufficient funds to pay off the lien in the event that
the client and provider cannot agree on a settlement amount*]

1073
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ORIGINAL

Fl L E D

Stephen A. Trost, #3286
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
Office of Attorney Discipline
645 S. 200 E.
SLC, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

DEC f 3 1993
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In t h e Matter of
t h e C o m p l a i n t by
C M . WILKERSON

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

against

F- 557
JOHN L. BLACK
DOB:
08-25-23
ADM:
06-12-52

q3C5W

Having reviewed the Findings of Fact# Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Disciplinary Hearing
Panel Committee of the Utah State Bar dated June 18, 1993, and
having reviewed the Order of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar dated June 24, 1993, this Court, being fully advised in
the premises, orders and decrees as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Order of the Board of Bar
Commissioners affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced Hearing
panel be and the same hereby is approved.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced
Hearing Panel be and the same hereby is incorporated herein as
though fully set forth.
Exhibit "F1
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Respondent, JOHN L. BLACK, be
and he hereby is disciplined for conduct unbecoming a member of the
Utah State Bar as follows:
1.
in

the

That Respondent shall make restitution to C M . Wilkerson
amount

of

$1,635.91

or

the

outstanding

balance

of

Wilkerson's bill, whichever is less within thirty (30) days from
the entry of this order.
2.

That Respondent shall be PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED.

DATED this

day of

, 1993.
UTAH SUPREME COURT

Gordon R. Hall
Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe
Associate Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart
Justice

Christine M. Durham
Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman
Justice

Approved as to form:
Parker M. Nielson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
proposed Order of Discipline was mailed postage pre-paid to Parker
M. Nielson, Attorney for Respondent at 655 South 200 East, S.L.C.,
UT 84111 on this 20th day of October, 1993

/>^7^?it^f r ^ ^ r ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^
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Parker M. Nielson

Attorney at Law (P.C.)
655 South 200 East
Salt U k « City, Utah 84111
(801)532-1150

June 3, 1993

Hand Delivered
Stephen A. Trost
Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834
Nayer H. Honarvar
Assistant Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834
Re:

Formal Complaint F-557 against John Black

Dear Mr. Trost and Mrs. Honarvar:
Mrs. Honarvar's letter of June 1, 1993 is certainly good
news. He are gratified to learn that this matter will now be
handled by a real court.
I agree that this development provides *a narrow window of
opportunity.* After July 1 you and Mrs. Honarvar will be subject
to the same rules as apply to other litigants, including Rule 11
and the prohibitions against bad faith litigation contained in
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56. In the same spirit as expressed
in Mrs. Honarvar's letter of June 1, Mr. Black will accept a
stipulation to dismiss your groundless, bad faith complaint prior
to July 1. Failing your doing so, Mr. Black has expressed a
resolve to pursue his remedy under the foregoing provisions.
Sincerely,

Parker M. Nielson
PMN/lh (0691)
cc: John Black Esq.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
HEARING PANEL:
Robert S. Howell, Chair
Sandra L. Sjogren
Stanley B. Bonham
In the Matter of the
Complaint by:
NOTICE OF TRIAL

C M . WILKERSON

F-557
against
JOHN L. BLACK
DOB: 05-25-23
ADM: 06-12-52
TO:

JOHN L. BLACK

Notice is hereby given that a trial- in the above-entitled
matter will be heard on Tuesday, June 15, 1993"*t 9:00 a.m. in the
Utah State Bar Law and JusticeXenter, 645 South 200 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 before the above-named hearing panel.
DATED this

/^"

day of

Ul//^

f

1993.

'L
C. Baldwin
utive Director
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Notice of Hearing was hand delivered to Parker M Nielson/ Attorney
for Respondent John L. alack at 655 Sojifcii 200 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on this ~ ^ T
day of {JtXsT7^
, 1993.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
Hearing Panel:
Robert S. Howell, Chair
Sandra L. Sjogren
Stanley B. Bonham
In the Matter of the
Complaint by

:
s

C. M. WILKERSON

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW &
RECOMMENDATION

I
against
JOHN L. BLACK
DOB: 08-25-23

F-557

On June 15, 1993, the Hearing Panel convened for a
formal hearing of the complaint by C. M. Wilkerson•

Nayer H.

Honarvar and Stephen A. Trost appeared on behalf of the Office of
Bar Counsel,

John L. Black appeared in person and was

represented by Parker M. Nielson.

From the evidence presented at

the hearing, the Panel makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

John L. Black [hereafter Black] represented Ruby Landers

[hereafter Landers] in a personal injury claim against 7-11
Stores beginning August 13, 1990 (ex. A ) .
2.

The fee for Black's services was a contingency fee of 33 1/3%

of any recovery from 7-11 (ex. A ) .
3.

On August 16, 1990, Landers notified Black that she had seen

on that day a chiropractic physician, C. M. Wilkerson [hereafter

Exhibit "I"
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Wilkerson], due to persistent pain from her injuries (ex, c).
4.

Black received a form entitled "Authorization of Direct

Payment and Doctor's Lien" [hereafter Lien] which he signed and
returned to Wilkerson along with a letter dated August 20, 1990
requesting a medical report (ex. D, ex. E).
5.

The Lien, which is signed by Landers and Black, clearly

directs Black to withhold sufficient funds from Landers'
settlement for the amount due Wilkerson and to pay Wilkerson for
his medical services (ex. E).
6.

Black's signature on the Lien appears directly below a

paragraph which clearly states that Black agrees to withhold the
funds from the settlement to protect Wilkerson.
7.

Black glanced over the Lien and realized that it involved

paying Wilkerson for his medical services out of any recovery
received by Landers.
8.

On February 19, 1991, Black again wrote to Wilkerson

requesting a medical report for use in settling the case (ex. F).
9.

Wilkerson produced a report dated February 19, 1991 (ex. H).

10.

Black received the report from Wilkerson.

11.

Black sent a copy of the report to the insurance adjustor

who represented 7-11's insurer.
12.

Mr. Tsakalos, the attorney who represented 7-11's insurer,

noticed a deposition of Landers and Black began negotiations to
settle the lawsuit to avoid increasing Landers' costs.

a
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13.

Tsakalos had a copy of the medical report during the

negotiations.
14.

7-11 offered $5000-00 to settle the case and Landers

accepted the offer.
15.

Tsakalos sent Black a check for $5000.00 made out to Black

and Landers.
16.

On August 26, 1991, Black sent Landers a check in the amount

of $3,364.09 and retained the remainder of the $5000.00
settlement as his fee (ex. I, ex. K ) .
17.

Black did not withhold any portion of the settlement to pay

Wilkerson and did not pay Wilkerson as promised in the Lien.
18.

Black was admitted to the Utah State Bar in 1952 and has a

reputation as an excellent personal injury lawyer.
19.

The panel adopts the expert opinion of Judge D. Frank

Wilkins that a lawyer should not pay a client's medical expenses
unless he is clearly directed to do so by the client.
20.

The panel also adopts Judge Wilkins' opinion that Black has

an excellent reputation for honesty and integrity.
21.

Judge Wilkins would be surprised if Black read the Lien (ex.

E) and then failed to withhold the funds necessary to protect
Wilkerson.
22.

Judge Wilkins would be surprised to hear that Black had

failed to read ex. E.
23.

The charges for Wilkerson's services amount to $2,465.00.
3
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

John L. Black violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct by representing that he agreed to withhold
funds to pay Dr. Wilkerson's charges and then failing to do as he
agreed in the Lien.
2.

John L. Black violated Rule 1.13(b) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct by failing to pay Wilkerson's charges out of
the settlement proceeds.
Having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Panel considered the following aggravating factors in determining
the appropriate sanctions:
1.

refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

2.

vulnerability of victim;

3.

substantial experience in the practice of law;

4.

indifference to making restitution.

The Panel found the following mitigating factors:
1.

absence of a prior disciplinary record;

2.

character or reputation;
Having weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, the

Panel determines that the aggravation exceeds the mitigation in
this case and issues the following:

4
23

RECOMMENDATION
John L. Black should be required to make restitution to C M ,
Wilkerson in the amount of $1,635.91 or the outstanding balance
of Wilkerson's bill, whichever is less.

While the panel may not

recommend anything less than a public reprimand, and does
recommend such discipline, the panel also strongly recommends
that the Board of Bar Commissioners consider reducing the public
reprimand to a private reprimand upon compliance with the
restitution order.
DATED this / $ '

day of June, 199 3.
/

/

/ROBERT s/HOWELL, CHAIR
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation were mailed to Parker
M. Nielson, 655 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by
certified mail, postal certificate number P-3> ^(U <?/ &

^9

day of June, 1993.

Q
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Stephen A. Trost, #3286
Disciplinary Counsel
Office of Attorney Discipline
645 S. 200 E.
SLC# UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

In re
Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability

Case No. 920334

COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through,
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and respectfully
submits this Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Clarification.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The issue to be resolved by the Motion for Clarification
relates solely to the procedural implementation

of the newly

adopted Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (RLDD). The RLDD
was the product of over four years of study by the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct, and after
being submitted for public comment, were adopted by the Court by a

Exhibit "J"

Minute Entry dated May 28, 1993, effective July 1, 1993.

See

Exhibit A.
A second Minute Entry, attached as Exhibit B and dated June
29, 1993, ordered that,

.•.all lawyer discipline matters which have
been voted as formal complaints by the
screening panels but which have not yet been
heard by the hearing panels shall be removed
to the district courts effective July 1, 1993.

Since implementing the new procedures a case1 has arisen that
was

tried by a hearing panel June

15, 1993, with Findings,

Conclusions and a Recommendation being submitted on June 18, 1993
and the same being reviewed by the Board of Bar Commissioners on
June

24,

1993.

An

Order

Affirming

Conclusions of Law and Recommendation

the

Findings

of

Fact,

of Discipline was then

entered.
The Respondent's counsel served (among others) the Executive
Director of the Bar on July 9, 1993 with a

H

Petition for (1)

Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration, And to Vacate the Order
1

The OAD has refrained from referencing the caption of the
case or otherwise identifying the Respondent since if the Court
orders the Bar Commission to hear the petition the Bar Commission
could reverse the Recommendation of the Hearing Panel for a Public
Reprimand and reduce to a private sanction which would prohibit
disclosure of the name of the Respondent to the public and to this
Court.
MEMORANDUM - PAGE -226

Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommendation
of Discipline, And

(2) For Sanctions Against Bar Counsel And

Assistant Bar Counsel" citing Rule XII(f), attached as Exhibit C,
of the former rules of procedure.
ISSUE FOR CLARIFICATION
Did the Board of Bar Commissioners lose jurisdiction to review
(reconsider) a prior Order accepting the Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendations of a Hearing Panel.
DISCUSSION
Under the former rules, the Bar Commission, pursuant to Rule
XII(e) acts as a intermediate appellate tribunal subsequent to a
trial before a hearing panel and prior to review by the Court.
Rule XII(e) states:

The Board shall review and consider the
findings, conclusions and recommendation of
the Hearing Committee [sic], and it may
affirm, modify or disaffirm the Hearing
Committee Tsicl determinations in whole or in
part. (emphasis added)

Following the Bar Commission's review and order, former Rule
XII(f) provided

a means by which either Bar Counsel

or the

Respondent could petition the Board for reconsideration of its
order to "affirm, modify or disaffirm".

In considering a petition

MEMORANDUM - PAGE -3-

for reconsideration the rule clearly contemplates that again the
Board is acting in an appellate capacity and that no evidentiary
hearing will be granted.

After directing the petition to be filed

with the Executive Director of the Bar the rule states:

The petition shall specify any proposed
amendment or modification and any reasons
advanced for reconsideration.
The petition
may be supported by legal argument and may be
accompanied by a request for oral argument.
The Board shall permit oral argument on the
petition if requested. (emphasis added)

The

Minute

Entry

of

May

28,

1993

repeals

the

Board's

jurisdiction as of midnight June 30, 1993 while the Minute Entry of
June 29, 1993 requires the removal to the district courts all
formal disciplinary cases
hearing panels."

H

which have not yet been heard by the

This case is therefore unique in that there was

a trial and therefore under a strict literal reading of the June
29, 1993 Minute Entry the case cannot be removed to the district
court yet cannot progress under the old rules since they were
abolished as of June 30, 1993.
The Office of Attorney Discipline suggests to the Court that
the petition should be dismissed and the Respondent directed to
file an appeal for the alleged errors, inappropriate sanction and
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other relief requested in the petition. The Respondent will incur
no prejudice in that he will be afforded appellate review by this
Court in lieu of the Bar Commissions appellate review.

Judicial

economy and unnecessary delay also are compelling arguments for the
Court to consider the appeal in that even if the old rules were in
place and the Commission heard the petition the ultimate appeal of
the issues raised lies with this Court.
CONCLUSION
The Court should order the Respondent to file an appeal since
he will incur no prejudice and to (1) keep the Minute Entry of May
28, 1993 an inviolate expression of the Court's intention to remove
the Bar Commission from discipline as of June 30, 1993, (2) forego
an unnecessary review by an intermediate body i.e., the Bar
Commission, and (3) expedite the proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 1993.

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

By:

M^^l^^

Stephen A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION was mailed

postage prepaid to Parker Nielson, at 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT
84111 on this i^_

day of <=><£<d^y^

MEMORANDUM

. 1993.

Parker M. Nielson

Attorney at Law (P.C.)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-1150

December 31, 1993

HAND DELIVERED
H. James Clegg, Esq.
President, Utah State Bar
10 Exchange Place #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Paul T. Moxley, Esq.
President Elect, Utah State Bar
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

John L. Black, F-557

Dear Messrs. Clegg and Moxley:
The enclosed "Certificate of Readiness for Supreme Court
Review" in the above matter signed by John C. Baldwin, Executive
Director of the Utah State Bar on December 10, 1993, has never
been served on either myself of John L. Black. I am aware of it
only because Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme
Court, advised me of it on December 30, 1993.
Failure to serve copies of papers on an adverse party (I
represent Mr. Black, as you both know) is itself a serious breach
of professionalism, ethics and the rules of the Supreme Court.
There are much more serious matters involved here, however.
The certificate filed by Baldwin is a knowing, intentional,
calculated falsehood. The statement that "Respondent has not
filed a Petition for Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration as
required by Rule XII(f)" is — to put it bluntly, in the language
of the street — a lie. You both know that the certification is
false, for Mr. Black's Petition dated July 9, 1993, plainly
denominated "pursuant to Rule XII(f), Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987)," was served
on each of you, personally. (I knew, even then, what kind of
people I was dealing with and took no chance on them not bringing
the Petition to your attention.)
There can be no doubt that Baldwin knows that his
certification is false. The Petition filed by Mr. Black is
attached to the certification. Moreover, Mr. Black sued Baldwin,
personally, on September 8, 1993 for relief in the nature of
30
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mandamus to force him to bring Mr. Black's Petition before the
Board of Bar Commissioners. Neither can there be any doubt that
Baldwin is aware of the mandamus proceeding, for he "back doored"
Chief Justice Hall on September 13, 1993 in an attempt to "moot"
the mandamus proceeding.
Baldwin then filed an affidavit with Judge Medley dated
September 16, 1993 alleging that Mr. Clegg conspired with him on
"back dooring* the Chief Justice. (The affidavit recites that "on
September 13, 1993 I telephoned Jim Clegg and indicated . . . that
I would communicate directly with Chief Justice Hall regarding the
motion.") After all that has transpired, I do not vouch for the
veracity of Baldwin, but you are both on notice of these matters
now, even if you were not aware of them before.
The conduct of Baldwin, and Stephen A. Trost at whose instance
he is acting, is a blatant violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is applicable to proceedings in the Supreme
Court. [See Rule 1(a).] It is also a violation of Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the following provisions of
Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
(1988) :
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY:
(1) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT
OR LAW TO A TRIBUNAL [OR];
*

*

*

*

(4) . . . . IF A LAWYER HAS OFFERED MATERIAL
EVIDENCE AND COMES TO KNOW OF ITS FALSITY, THE
LAWYER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES,
I have notified Baldwin of those matters by letter hand
delivered to him on this date and demanded that his certification be withdrawn.
You, and both of you, also have responsibility for these
matters. Rule 5.1, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
(1988) provides:
(C) A LAWYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANOTHER
LAWYER'S VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT IF:
*

*

*

*

(2) THE LAWYER . . . HAS DIRECT SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY OVER THE OTHER LAWYER, AND KNOWS OF THE
CONDUCT AT A TIME WHEN ITS CONSEQUENCES CAN BE
AVOIDED OR MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO TAKE REASONABLE
REMEDIAL ACTION.
31

I notified Mr. Moxley of the foregoing rule, and his obligation
under it with respect to Trost by letter dated July 28, 1993. I
am notifying both of you, again, by this letter.
Baldwin's false certification, and the order accompanying it
which was filed by Trost, are scheduled for hearing before the
Supreme Court on January 10, 1994. There is ample time to avoid
or mitigate the effects of the false certification before that
date. I have demanded that Baldwin withdraw the false
certification. I hereby demand that you, and each of you,
discharge your supervisory authority with respect to both Baldwin
and Trost by seeing that they withdraw their false filings.
Failing your doing so, I will hold you strictly accountable under
the foregoing provisions.
Govern yourselves accordingly.
Very truly yours,

Parker M. Nielson
PMN:
Enclosure
(0699)

32

Parker M. Nielson

Attorney at Law (P.C.)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-1150

December 16, 1993

CERTIFIED MAIL
H. James Clegg, Esq.
President, Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Re:

John L. Black, F-557

Dear Mr. Clegg:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j)# Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
[applicable to appeals to the Board under Rule 17(a), Amended
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (effective July 1,
1993)], I am advising of significant new authority bearing upon
your order of June 24, 1993, and Mr. Black's pending Petition
for Reconsideration and Sanctions dated July 9, 1993.
State v. Robinson, 222 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (decided Sept.
29, 1993) (Russon, J.), held an order of restitution
unconstitutional under the Utah and United States constitutions
in cases involving "only negligence, and not criminal intent."
Id. 75. The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous Utah cases
holding that the essence of due process "is the opportunity to
be fully heard," that an order of restitution must be
"preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing" (emphasis
by the court) and that the right "has little reality or worth
unless one . . . can choose for himself whether to contest."
That dicta has particular application to your order of
"restitution" against Mr. Black dated June 24, 1993. There was
no hearing before the Board preceding your order, and there was
no finding that Mr. Black had criminal intent. The Board
subsequently adopted Rule IX-E of the Interprofessional Code, a
copy of which is attached, which (after the "exception" Trost
inserted, without the approval of the Committee, was deleted)
conclusively establishes that Mr. Black properly refused to pay
the claim of his client's chiropractor, and that your order
directing him to do so was improper. It follows, therefore,
that your order, like the one of Judge McCleve that Judge Russon
had before him, is unconstitutional. Mr. Black demanded a
hearing before the Board by his Petition dated July 9, 1993,
which demand is "at issue," a Notice to Submit for Decision
having been filed on July 27, 1993.
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H. James Clegg, Esq.
December 16, 1993
Page 2

The foregoing dicta is directly relevant, as well, to the
allegations of the Petition concerning Trost and Honarvar
witholding notice of your Order of June 24, 1993. Rather than
transmit the Order, as you surely intended, they held it until
June 29, 1993 and then mailed it, knowing that it would not
and could not be delivered until after July 1, 1993 and then
claimed that the jurisdiction of the Board had expired. Their
obvious purpose was to frustrate and deny Mr. Black the*right to
demand a hearing. Judge Russon's opinion effectively declares
that the Order was rendered unconstitutional by Trost and
Honarvar's cunning and that Mr. Black's Petition of July 9,
1993, must be granted.
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, has
also advised me that someone, who he did not identify, has
purported to file papers concerning Mr. Black, the nature of
which I do not know. Such filing is a blatant violation of Rule
21(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for no papers were
served on Mr. Black or his counsel. Moreover, such a filing
disregards Rule XII(g), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar (1987), which required that you certify "all
proceedings before the Board having been concluded." Obviously,
all proceedings are not concluded unless and until Mr. Black's
Petition of July 9, 1993 is heard and decided.
A final matter I should mention is that Ethics Advisory
Opinion No. 115 of the Utah State Bar, issued on May 20, 1993
has come to my attention. In the opinion the Board concludes
that "Rule 4.2 [Utah State Bar, Rules of Professional Conduct]
allows unrestricted access to government agencies and employees
for communications 'authorized by law.'" Failure of the Board
to act on Mr. Black's Petition of July 9 demonstrates that it
has been witheld from the Board by someone, presumably Mr.
Baldwin, with or without your consent and in disregard of your
own opinion that the right of Petition cannot be interferred
with. Mr. Black has the right to, and will expect that the
Board conform to its own opinions.
Respectfully,

y Parker M. Nielson
PMN/lh (0088)
cc: Stephen Trost
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E. Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges
An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts, medical or otherwise, incurred by a client
except as provided in Rule 1.8(e)1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, However, where the
attorney contracts for services on behalf of his/her client, which expenses are necessary to the
proper preparation and presentation of the client's case, the attorney should expect to make
payments for the services. Therefore, while the attorney should not pay for or guarantee
payment of medical services rendered to the client, the attorney should pay directly for medical
reports, conferences with physicians, time spent in depositions or in court, and look to the
attorney's client for iemibursemcnt of these costs which the attorney has advanced on behalf of
the client.
The physician should bill the patient and not the attorney for medical care rendered to
the patient. The physician should bill the attorney for services rendered on behalf of the patient
at the attorney's request. The attorney should pay these amounts promptly and as they are
billed, and should not wait the outcome of litigation before paying the same.

l

Rule 1.8(e):
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1)
A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation the repayment
of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter, and
(2)
A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses
of litigation on behalf of the client. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(e), p. 12
(Amended 1988); Utah Court Rules. Chapter 13, Rules of Professional Conduct, p. 970
(1993).
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Utah State liar
Office of Attorney Discipline
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City Utah 84111 -3834
Telephone* (801) 531-9110-FAX (801) 531-0660 • WATS 1-800-698-9077

October 20, 1993

Parker Nielson, Esq.
655 S. 200 E.
S.L.C., UT 84111
RE:

John L. Black, F-557

Dear Mr. Nielson:
As you know, the Utah Supreme Court on August 16,
1993/ in response to my Motion for Clarification, granted
"leave for respondent to file an appeal with this court."
Although the Supreme Court did not require a Notice of
Appeal to be filed within the customary 30 day period,
nonetheless, I presumed you would.
It has now been in
excess of 60 days since the Court entered their order and
I would like to move this case along.
To that end I'm enclosing a copy of Rule XIV of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar that were in
effect until July 1, 1993. As you can see the respondent
is required to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of
being served the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation
of the Board. The Board served the same on about June 29,
1993 by mailing a copy to you.
If you would rather have the Supreme Court enter an
order on the Board's order and proceed with the appeal
thereafter, I have prepared the same for your approval as
to form.
In short, I have no preference as to which
procedural course you choose to take, I simply want to
conclude this case.
Sincerely,

Stephen A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
SAT:clf
Enclosure
1795
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Gregory J. Sanders, #2858
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314
(801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN L. BLACK

:

Petitioner,
vs.
STEPHEN A. TROST, NAYER H.
HONARVAR, H. JAMES CLEGG, JOHN C.
BALDWIN AND THE UTAH STATE BAR
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN C. BALDWIN
Civil No.
Judge

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, JOHN C. BALDWIN, being first duly sworn, affirm and state that:
1.

On August 18, 1993 I received a Motion for Appointment of Special

Counsel and Screening Panel. The motion was captioned "In the Matter of the Complaint by
C. M. Wilkerson against John L. Black, F-557, and moved the Board of Bar Commissioners to
request the appointment of a special counsel and screening panel to present and hear allegations
of ethical misconduct by Stephen A. Trost and Nayer H. Honarvar of the Office of Attorney
Discipline. The motion was signed by John L. Black, Respondent and Parker M. Nielson,
Attorney for Respondent.
2.

On August 19, 1993 I notified Bar President H. James Clegg that the Bar

had received the Motion; that the procedure by which such a request would be handled was3
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unclear under the new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and that under the former Rules of Discipline
we would have referred this matter directly to Dale Kimball, Chair of the Ethics & Discipline
Committee. I also indicated to him that a similar procedure would be appropriate under the new
rules but that Dale Kimball and his committee had not yet been reappointed by the Supreme
Court. Jim advised me to communicate with the Utah Supreme Court to request that the Court
reappoint the Ethics & Discipline Committee, and that once the committee had been reappointed
I should direct this matter to Dale Kimball for him to resolve with the Court. Jim also indicated
to me that I should notify the Commission at its upcoming meeting on August 26th regarding
the motion and the procedures followed to have it processed.
3.

On August 26, 1993 I notified the Bar Commission that we had received

the motion; that we would request the Supreme Court to reappoint the Ethics & Discipline
Committee and we would forward on the motion to Dale Kimball once the appointments had
been made.
4.

On August 27, 1993 I mailed a letter to Chief Justice Hall from H. James

Clegg which proposed that the Court reappoint the Ethics & Discipline Committee pursuant to
Rule 3(a) of the new Rules of Discipline.
5.

On September 13, 1993 I telephoned Dale Kimball and explained to him

that we had requested the Supreme Court to reappoint the Ethics & Discipline Committee; that
we had received a Motion for Appointment of Special Counsel and Screening Panel and that
ordinarily we would have directed this immediately to him but because it was unclear under the
new rules as to how we should proceed and because his committee had not yet been reappointed,
we had been waiting for the Supreme Court to act upon our request. I indicated to Dale,I would
be willing to communicate directly with Chief Justice Hall to inquire regarding the status of

2
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reappointments to the Ethics & Discipline Committee and would inform him about the request
for special appointment.
6.

On September 13, 1993 I telephoned Jim Clegg and indicated that I had

discussed the motion with Dale Kimball and that I would communicate directly with Chief
Justice Hall regarding the motion and our request that the committee be reappointed.
7.

On September 13, 1993 I telephoned Chief Justice Hall and indicated that

we had received a complaint against Stephen Trost and Nayer Honarvar which required the
appointment of a special counsel and screening panel pursuant to the new rules. I indicated that
the new rules were unclear regarding how to proceed in this matter; that we had been awaiting
the Court's reappointment of the Ethics & Discipline Committee so that we could have followed
our regular procedures and referred the motion directly to Dale Kimball, but because the
committee had not been reappointed yet, I would be referring these matters directly on to the
Court,
7.

On September 14, 1993 I mailed a copy of the Motion for Appointment

of Special Counsel and Screening Panel to Chief Justice Hall.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this 16th day of September, 1993.

Subscribed and sworn before me thisr^Tj^day of \A/7ftLr\\^6
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Stephen A. Trost, #3286
Disciplinary Counsel
Office of Attorney Discipline
645 S. 200 E.
SLC, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

In re
Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability

Case No. 920334

COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through,
Stephen A. Trost, Chief

Disciplinary

Counsel and moves

this

Honorable Court pursuant to Rule 23 for clarification of 1) the
Court's Minute

Entry

dated

May

28, 1993 wherein

the

former

Procedures of Discipline were repealed as of June 30, 1993, and 2)
the Court's Minute Entry dated June 29, 1993 transferring all
formal complaints, which had not been tried, to the district courts
effective July lf 1993-
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This motion is accompanied by a Memorandxim in Support of the
Motion for Clarification.
Oral argument is not requested.

DATED this lgth day of July, 1993-

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

B S

Y

My$^~ ft- VT^.
Stepfien A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION was mailed postage prepaid to Parker Nielsonf at 655 S. 200
E., S.L.C., UT 84111 on this /f

day of -<U^^^

Qf^-iZt ^ X

1993.

^^—ytj^^t^yt^)
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Parker M. Nielson

Attorney at Law (P.C.)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-1150

December 31, 1993

HAND DELIVERED
John C. Baldwin, Esq.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Re:

John L. Black, F-557

Dear Mr. Baldwin:
Your "Certificate of Readiness for Supreme Court Review"
in the above matter dated December 10, 1993, a copy of which
is attached, has never been served on either myself of John
L. Black. I am aware of it only because Mr. Geoffrey J.
Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, advised me of it on
December 30, 1993.
Your certificate, the representation that "Respondent
has not filed a Petition for Amendment, Modification or
Reconsideration as required by Rule XII(f)" in particular,
is false. In fact, John L. Black's Petition, plainly
denominated "pursuant to Rule XII(f), Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1,
1987)" is at pages 215-233 of the Document Index which you
filed with the Supreme Court with your certificate.
Demand is hereby made that you withdraw your certification, immediately. Failure to do so will be deemed a
violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
is applicable to proceedings in the Supreme Court. [See
Rule 1(a).] It will also be a violation of Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
You are further notified of the following provisions of
Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State
Bar (effective January 1, 1988):
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY:
(1) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT
OR LAW TO A TRIBUNAL [OR];
42
Exhibit "P"

*

*

*

*

(4) . • . . IF A LAWYER HAS OFFERED MATERIAL
EVIDENCE AND COMES TO KNOW OF ITS FALSITY, THE
LAWYER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES,
There can be no doubt that you have actual knowledge
that your certification is false. Not only is Mr. Black's
Petition plainly contained in the file which you certified
to the Supreme Court, but Mr. Black sued you, personally, on
September 8, 1993 for relief in the nature of mandamus to
force you to present Mr. Black's Petition to the Board of
Bar Commissioners. There can be no doubt that you are fully
aware of that proceeding, for you then "back doored" Chief
Justice Hall in an attempt to "moot" the mandamus
proceeding, and filed an affidavit with Judge Medley
acknowledging that you did so.
If you fail to withdraw your false certification, and do
so before January 10, 1994 when this matter is scheduled for
hearing before the Utah Supreme Court, both Mr. Black and
myself.will take any and all remedial action which is
appropriate under any of the foregoing rules.
Govern yourself accordingly.
Very truly yours,

Parker M. Nielson
PMN:
Enclosure
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UTAH STATE BAR
ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION COMMITTEE
Opinion No. 115
(Approved May 20, 1993)

Issue: Under what circumstances may a lawyer who represents a private party
contact the employees of a government agency if the private party is involved in
litigation against the agency?
Opinion: Because the Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee all
private citizens access to government, all communication, whether oral or in writing,
with employees or officials of a government agency under any circumstances are
permitted. Thus, a lawyer representing a government office or department may not
prevent his non-government counterpart from contacting any employee of the government office or department outside the presence of the government attorney,
whether or not the communication involves a matter in litigation. However, if counsel for a private party contacts a government employee about pending litigation,
counsel must inform the government employee (a) about the pending litigation or
that the matter has been referred to agency counsel and (b) about his representation
of a private party in that litigation.
Analysis: Access to government agencies must be unrestricted. Rule 4.2 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
The comment to Rule 4.2 states (emphasis added):
This Rule does not prohibit communication with a party, or an
employee or agent of a party, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party.. . does not prohibit a lawyer for
either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other
regarding a separate matter. Also, . . . a lawyer having independent
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justification for communicating with the other party is permitted to do
so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of
a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter
Rule 4.2 allows unrestricted access to government agencies and employees for
communications "authorized by law." The comment to Rule 4.2 provides that a
communication authorized by law includes "the right of a party to a controversy with
a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter." This
part of the comment to Model Rule 4.2 was grounded in the U. S. Constitution, and
finds nearly identical support in the Utah Constitution.1
Thus, private citizens have a constitutional right of access to government,
including government officials. Any interest a government agency might have in
being protected from statements made by its employees is outweighed by the First
Amendment interests of private parties to "petition for redress" and of the agency's
own employees.2 Further, the government has a "duty to advance the public's
interest in achieving justice, an ultimate obligation that outweighs its narrower interest in prevailing in a lawsuit."3
One commentator has noted:
Requiring the consent of an adversary lawyer seems particularly
inappropriate when the adversary is a government agency. Constitutional guarantees of access to government and statutory policies encouraging government in the sunshine seems hostile to a rule that
prohibits a citizen from access to an adversary governmental party
without prior clearance from the party's lawyer. Because of such considerations, the comment to [Model Rule] 4.2 provides that the rule
does not impair the right of a party to speak with government offi-

l

"Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const,
amend. I. "All men have the inherent and inalienable right... to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances." Utah Const,
art. I, § 1.
2

Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1977).

3

Frey v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32, 37 (ED.N.Y. 1985).

115-2

cials/
The broad language of the comment to Rule 4.2 does not restrict a private
party's right of access, whether personally or through counsel, even in those instances
when litigation is pending.5 The California Bar Association has gone so far as to
clarify this unrestricted access by amending Model Rule 4.2 to provide that the rule
"shall not apply to communications with a public officer, board, committee or
body."6 This Committee interprets Rule 4.2 as written to incorporate this access to
public officials by a party's attorney.
Obligations of Contacting Attorney. The authorities cited above give counsel
for a private party wide rein in contacting government employees, both generally and
with respect to matters in litigation. As an officer of the court, however, counsel has
an obligation to deal with those employees in an open and honest manner. Therefore, if counsel is contacting a government employee about pending litigation, counsel shall inform the government employee (a) about the pending litigation or that the
matter has been referred to agency counsel, and (b) about his representation of a
private party in that litigation. The government employee is free to refuse to speak
to-.counsel for the private party or to request that the agency's counsel or counsel for
the employee be present7

4

C Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 614-15 (footnotes omitted).

5

See Kentucky Bar Op. E-332 (1988), which cites the comment to Rule 4.2 in
support of its conclusion to permit broad access to public officials by attorneys for
private parties.
6

C Wolfram, Model Legal Ethics at 615 n.59.

n

See Frey, 106 FJUD. at 38.
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Utah £>tate Bar
645 South 200 East • Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3834
Telephone. (801) 531-9077 • (WATS) 1-800-698-9077
FAX (801) 531-0660

J u l y 19,

Parker M. Nielson
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

1993

84111

John Black F-557

Dear Mr. Nielson:
While Mr. Howell advised you that a tape recording of
the hearing would be made available in his letter dated
June 21, 1993, he was only half correct. I am not able to
.provide you with a copy of the tape, but I can allow you to
receive a transcript of the proceedings for June 15, 1993.
This would require that the tapes be sent out for
transcription and the cost of the transcription would be
assessed to your office.
The Board of Bar Commissioners meeting on June 24,
1993 was not recorded and I do not have access to the
proceedings of this meeting. I am not sure if there were
minutes taken, but you may wish to contact Mr. John
Baldwin, Executive Director to determine how the meeting
was recorded.
Please advise me as soon as possible if you request a
transcript and I will have the tapes sent out.
Sincerely,

Leslee A. Ron
Clerk of the Court
cc:

Nayer Honarvar

Exhibit "Q"

PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
Attorney for John Black
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
-oooOoooIn the Matter of the
Complaint by
C M . WILKERSON
against
JOHN L. BLACK
DOB: : 05-25-23
ADM:
06-12-52

PETITION FOR (1) AMENDMENT,
MODIFICATION OR RECONSIDERATION, AND TO VACATE THE
ORDER AFFIRMING FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE,
AND (2) FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST
BAR COUNSEL AND ASSISTANT BAR
COUNSEL
File No. F-557
•oooOooo-

Respondent John L. Black ("Petitioner" herein) petitions the
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar ("Board" herein),
pursuant to Rule XII(f), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987), for vacation of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation of the
Hearing Panel herein dated June 18, 1993 ("findings" herein), a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," and the Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of
Discipline herein dated June 24, 1993, (the "Order" herein), a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B," or, in the
alternative, for the amendment, modification or reconsideration
thereof.
Petitioner and his undersigned counsel further petition the
Exhibit "R"
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Board of Bar Commissioners for the censure of Stephen A. Trost,
Bar Counsel ("Trost" herein), and Nayer H. Honarvar, Assistant
Bar Counsel ("Honarvar" herein) , for reprehensible and
unprofessional conduct unbecoming one holding public office, and
for imposition of damages against Trost and Honarvar for bad
faith litigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-27-56.
In support thereof, Petitioner respectfully represents:
1.

Rule XII(g), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State

Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987), provides that a determination by the Board in a disciplinary matter shall be
certified to the Utah Supreme Court, which certification shall
be "upon all proceedings before the Board having been
concluded," including a petition pursuant to Rule XII(f) to
amend, modify or reconsider the findings, conclusions or
recommendation, after oral argument before the Board (if
requested)•
2.

The Board is without jurisdiction, including to

entertain a Petition to amend, modify or reconsider the
findings, conclusions or recommendation pursuant to Rule XII(f),
or certify any determination to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Rule XIII(g), because of the misconduct of Trost and Honarvar
set out herein, including in particular Trost and Honarvar's
corrupt and reprehensible practice of witholding notice of
action by the Panel and the Board until June 29, 1993 knowing
that the jurisdiction of the Board over disciplinary proceedings
would expire and the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State
Bar had been repealed effective June 30, 1993, at 12 midnight,

by virtue of the Minute Entry of the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah dated May 28, 1993, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit "C."

The letter of Honarvar dated June 1, 1993

attached hereto as Exhibit "D" establishes that both she and
Trost were well aware that any order concerning discipline must
be "to the Supreme Court by June 3 0" and that "thereafter the
Bar Commission will no longer be involved in any way with
discipline."
3.

The Order should be set aside because it, and the

proceedings leading up to it, are incoherent, unintelligible,
contradictory and unenforceable.

Honarvar recommended a public

reprimand at the time of hearing, but the Panel recommended a
private reprimand.

The Order adopted "the recommendation of the

Office of Bar Counsel [that] the Public Reprimand be reduced to
a Private Reprimand," but then ordered that "Respondent be
Publicly Reprimanded" without offering any explanation of the
inconsistency.

[We submit that the Order shows on its face that

it was, in fact, prepared by Honarvar and is further evidence of
ineptitude of Bar Counsel.]
4.

Trost and Honarvar wrongfully and corruptly conspired to

deprive Petitioner of due process under the rules of procedure
applicable to the conduct of nonjury civil trials in the
district courts of the State of Utah, which apply to
disciplinary proceedings by virtue of Rule XII(b), Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1,
1987), including by the following:
(a) Failing to provide Petitioner notice of the
50
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proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation
of the Hearing Panel pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, or pursuant to the directions of the
Chairman of the Panel, which is documented by the letter of
Robert S. Howell attached hereto as Exhibit "E."
(b) Failing to provide Petitioner notice of the
proposed Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Recommendation of Discipline, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2),
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
(c) Failing to provide Petitioner notice in a prompt
and lawyerlike fashion that the Order dated June 24, 1993 had
been entered, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
(d) Trost acted to deprive Petitioner of due process by
instructing Hearing Panel Chairman Howell that he must make his
decision at or before a date specified by Trost, for the purpose
of enabling Trost and Honarvar to complete the other acts
alleged herein before June 30, 1993.
(e)

Wrongfully acting, and Petitioner is informed and

believes, conspiring, to deprive Petitioner of the right to
petition the Board, to request oral argument and to demonstrate
the impropriety of the findings, conclusions and Order herein in
a hearing before the Board, as set out herein, by witholding
notice of the foregoing findings and Order entered on June 18
and 24, respectively, until the 29th day of June, 1993, and even
at that late date mailing notice to Petitioner's counsel, even
though counsel's office is a few scant feet from Bar Counsel's
4

office, at 655 South 200 East, knowing that it would not be
delivered until June 30, 1993 at the earliest and that the
jurisdiction of the Board would expire at 12 midnight on June
30, 1993 before Petitioner could exercise his rights.
(f) Each of the foregoing was knowing, intentional and
for the corrupt purpose of depriving Petitioner of his
procedural and substantive rights, as is documented by the
letter of Honarvar dated June 1, 1993 attached hereto as Exhibit
"D."
5.

For the foregoing reasons, the findings, conclusions and

Order herein (dated June 18, 1993) and the Order of
President-Elect Clegg (dated June 24, 1993) were not properly
entered and are a nullity under Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, requiring that "copies of the proposed
findings, judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court for signature" and
that "notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and
counsel within five days after service,"

The Utah Supreme Court

has held that orders entered without conforming to Rule 4-504(2)
are void and of no effect.

Bigelow

v. Ingersoll,

618 P.2d 50,

53 (Utah 1983) (the Rule "requires that copies of a proposed
judgment be served on opposing counsel before being presented to
the court").

Accord,

Calfo

699 (Utah 1986); Wayne Garff

v. D.C. Steward
Constr.

Co.,

Co.,
Inc.

706 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1989 (per curiam); Larsen

Ill
v.

v.

P.2d 697,
Richards,

Larsen,

674

P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
6.

Trost and Honarvar are guilty of reprehensible conduct,

evident on the face of the findings, conclusions and Order
herein, in disregard of Rule XII(i), Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar (as amended through July 1, 1987), which
provided that
Neither Bar Counsel nor members of the
disciplinary staff shall engage in ex parte
communications with members of the Board or
members of the Hearing Committee concerning any
disciplinary case that is being or may be considered by the Board or the Hearing Committee.
The findings, conclusions and Order herein were not served on
Petitioner or his counsel as required by Rule 5, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, but there was obvious and necessary ex parte
contact between Bar Counsel and President-Elect Clegg in
disregard of the foregoing Rule, for the Order signed by
President-Elect Clegg shows on its face that it was prepared for
Mr. Clegg's signature by Honarvar and that a secretary to Bar
Counsel signed the mailing certificate.

Honarvar, Trost and/or

disciplinary staff have also, obviously, been in contact with
Robert S. Howell, Chair of the Hearing Panel, for the same
secretary to Bar Counsel signed the certificate of service of
the findings, notice of which had never been given to Petitioner.
7.

We will leave it to President-Elect (now President)

Clegg to explain how his Order came to be prepared for him by
Honarvar, how she was directed or authorized to do so without
notice to counsel for Petitioner, how the Order dated June 24,
1993 was signed before Petitioner had an opportunity to demand a
hearing before the Panel and how it came into the possession of
Honarvar and disciplinary staff, but was not delivered to

6

53

Petitioner and counsel for Petitioner despite the clear
provision at Rule XII(e) "that a copy of the findings,
conclusions and recommendation shall be served upon Bar Counsel
and the attorney

in question

or his

counsel"

(emphasis added)

and how or why Honarvar and disciplinary staff held the Order
for five (5) days before sending it to counsel for Petitioner,
or if President-Elect Clegg authorized them to do so, and what,
if any purpose there was in the critical five (5) day delay
other than to frustrate Petitioner's right to object under Rule
4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administraion and to permit the
jurisdiction of the Board to expire before Petitioner could take
any action to preserve his right to due process, including a
hearing before the Board.
8.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommen-

dation of the Hearing Panel herein dated June 18, 1993, and the
Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline herein dated June 24, 1993, are in
error and should be set aside or amended, as follows:
(a) The Order should be vacated because Bar Counsel
failed to meet the burden of proof prescribed at Rule XII(c),
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as amended
through July 1, 1987), requiring that the "burden of proof shall
be on Bar Counsel to sustain the Formal Committee Complaint, or
various counts thereof, by clear
(Emphasis added.)

and convincing

evidence."

Neither the Order nor the findings determine

that the necessary burden of proof was met and, to the contrary,
the recording of the proceedings herein will reveal that Bar
7
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Counsel presented no evidence

—

none, of any description

—

at the time of hearing.
(b) The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel herein dated June 18, 1993
conclusively reveal that Bar Counsel failed to meet its burden
of proof, or to adduce any evidence, of

any description,

in

that every exhibit cited in support of the findings was an
exhibit offered by Petitioner.

Viz.,

Bar Counsel exhibits

were numbered while Petitioner's exhibits were lettered.

The

lettered exhibits do not meet the "clear and convincing"
evidence standard, but cannot properly be relied upon by Bar
Counsel in any event because Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint at the conclusion of Bar Counsel's case, at which time
no evidence had been offered.

The motion was denied, improperly

under the foregoing rule, and evidence taken thereafter cannot
be considered as meeting Bar Counsel's burden.
(c) The findings and Order are in error, as a matter of
law, in light of Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 98,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F."

The Ethics

Advisory Opinion, a copy of which was filed with the Panel,
states as follows:
Absent dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, disputes resulting from the failure
of an attorney to make payment for services
rendered by third parties should be treated as
questions of substantive law, which should be
examined under traditional contract and agency
doctrines, rather than questions of the ethical
propriety of the attorney's actions.
The findings and Order make no reference to Ethics Advisory

8
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Opinion No. 98 and fail to distinguish its conclusions and are
therefore in error.
(d)

The findings and Order are in error, as a matter of

law, in light of Utah State Bar Interprofessional Code (Second
Edition), a copy of which was filed with the Panel and is attached
hereto as Exhibit "G," which plainly states at Section IX(E):

An attorney is ethically

forbidden

to pay

debts, medical or otherwise, incurred by a
client. . . . the attorney should not (and
ethically
cannot)
pay for or guarantee payment
of medical services rendered to the client. . . .
The physician should bill the patient and
not the attorney for medical care rendered to
the patient. The physician should bill the
attorney for services rendered on behalf of the
patient at the attorney's request.
(Emphasis
added.)
The findings and Order make no reference to the foregoing
provision and fail to distinguish its clear provisions and are
therefore in error.
(e)

The recommendation that "John L. Black should be

required to make restitution to C M . Wilkerson in the amount of
$1,635.91" is without any basis in the evidence.

Bar counsel

never offered evidence of any description, testimonial or
otherwise, of any amount owing to Dr. Wilkerson.

The only

evidence was the testimony of Petitioner that his client had paid
or was paying Dr. Wilkerson's bill.

Indeed, the sum of $1,635.91

does not appear anywhere in these proceedings, including in the
evidence, in the discovery, in the pleadings or in the memoranda
submitted by the parties.

Honarvar simply inserted the figure in

the findings, from whence we do not know, and neither Petitioner
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nor the Board can determine its source.
(f) Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are in error, as a
matter of law, because there was no evidence,
description,

of

any

that Petitioner was involved in dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rules 1.13(b) or
8.4(c).

The most that can be said of Bar Counsel's claim is that

Petitioner signed a document, which Bar Counsel contends and
Petitioner denies was a medical lien.
accepted, arguendo,

Even if that contention be

violation of the agreement is, at most, a

breach of contract claim.
(g) Findings of Fact No. 21 is improper and misstates the
evidence in that Judge Wilkins did not testify that he would "be
surprised if Black . . . failed to withold the funds necessary to
protect Wilkerson."
(h) Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are in error, as a
matter of law, because they are inconsistent and irreconcilable
with Finding of Fact No. 19, adopting the opinion of Judge Wilkins
"that a lawyer should not pay a client's medical expenses unless
he is clearly directed to do so by the client." There is no
evidence of such a direction herein and there was no finding of
any such direction.
(i) Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are in error, as a
matter of law, because they are inconsistent and irreconcilable
with Finding of Fact No. 20, adopting the opinion of Judge Wilkins
that Petitioner "has an excellent reputation for honesty and
integrity."
9.

The conduct of Trost and Honarvar herein is reprehensible
57
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and unethical in that they are employing, or attempting to employ,
the disciplinary process to collect, or force the payment of a
mere civil claim asserted on behalf of a California chiropractor.
10.

The conduct of Honarvar herein is reprehensible and

sanctionable in that she refused, during the course of discovery,
to admit that she had no evidence of specific acts of dishonesty,
yet produced absolutely no evidence, of any description, either
testimonial or documentary, at the time of hearing to support that
allegation.

Honesty and fairness on the part of Bar Counsel and

the lawyer's obligation of candor with court and counsel required,
therefore, that Honarvar voluntarily dismiss the charge of
violation of Rule 8.4(c).
11.

The tape recording of the proceedings before the Panel

will reveal that Trost and Honarvar made knowingly false
accusations against Petitioner, and his undersigned counsel, for
the purpose of depriving Petitioner of substantive due process.
The recording will show that Honarvar, with Trost seated at her
side, stated on the record that Mr. Black should be subjected to
a public reprimand because he had made false statements in the
disciplinary proceedings.

When the Chairman of the Disciplinary

Panel, Mr. Robert S. Howell, challenged that statement because
there had been no showing that any evidence had been
misrepresented, and asked Honarvar what evidence she claimed had
been misrepresented, she admitted that there had been no
misrepresentation, but then repeated the charge again, on the
record, the second time adding the accusation that counsel for
Mr. Black, the undersigned Petitioner, had misrepresented the

evidence and therefore Mr. Black should be publicly
reprimanded.

The undersigned counsel for Mr. Black, Parker M.

Nielson, then "demanded" that Mrs. Honarvar state what false
statements she had reference to.

She refused, and neither she

nor Trost offered to withdraw the accusations.
12.

The accusations by Trost and Honarvar that Petitioner

and his counsel had misrepresented the evidence is blatant and
reprehensible under the Comment to Rule 3.3, Utah State Bar Code
of Professional Conduct, which explains that "an assertion
purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge . . . may
properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is
true or believes it to be true on the basis of reasonably
diligent inquiry."

There can be no pretense that either Trost

or Honarvar knew, or believed it to be true that either Mr.
Black or Mr. Nielson had misrepresented evidence.

Mr. Howell

declared, on the record, that there had been no evidence of a
misrepresentation and Mr. Nielson demanded that any claimed
misrepresentation be stated.

Neither Mr. Trost nor Mrs.

Honarvar offered any support for their claims, but nevertheless
repeated them.

The Comment to Rule 3.3 explains the prohibition

against "Misleading Legal Argument" further, as follows:
Legal argument based on a knowingly false
representation of law constitutes dishonesty
toward a tribunal.
13.

Trost and Honarvar further acted to deprive Petitioner

of due process herein, including reasonable notice and a right
to reasonably prepare his defense, by submitting the letter
dated June 1, 1993 attached hereto as Exhibit "D," attempting to
12

"extort" Petitioner into consenting to discipline.

Speci-

fically , the letter states that, if Petitioner did not "consent"
to discipline, the matter would be presented to the courts under
the recent revision of disciplinary proceedings by the Utah
Supreme Court.

When Petitioner responded that he would be

delighted to present Trost's and Honarvar's fanciful charges to
a "real court," but that Trost and Honarvar would be subject to
Rule 11 sanctions and prohibitions against "bad faith"
litigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, they
disregarded Petitioner's stated request and immediately set the
matter for trial before a disciplinary panel —

with but one

weeks notice, and without the courtesy of determining if the
date was convenient to Petitioner or his counsel.
implication is clear.

The

Trost and Honarvar knew that their

complaint would not withstand "bad faith" scrutiny, nor would
their charges against Mr. Black and his counsel withstand the
test of good faith imposed by Rule 11.

They could not permit it

to be reviewed by a "real court," and did not have the
professionalism to withdraw it.
14.

Trost has acted to deprive Petitioner of substantive

due process in these proceedings by attempting to change the
rules, ex post

facto,

to cover a complaint against Petitioner

which he knew did not state an ethical violation.

The

Memorandum of Trost dated April 27, 1993, attached hereto as
Exhibit "H" documents his attempt to change the Rules of
Professional Conduct, ex post

facto,

to cover complaints he

had caused to be filed against members of the Bar which his own
60
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Memorandum acknowledge did not state ethical violations.

In

context, it is clear that Trost's Memorandum contemplates the
Complaint against Petitioner herein.
15.

The reprehensible conduct of Honarvar in these

proceedings is further evident in that she has caused Finding of
Fact No. 23 to be entered, reciting that "the charges for
Wilkerson's services amount to $2,465.00," without presenting
any evidence supporting the finding and, moreover, while
concealing the fact, well known to her, that Petitioner's client
has paid or was paying the bill and that there may, in fact, be
no amount owing.
16.

These proceedings illustrate that Trost and Honarvar

practice outright extortion, in the name of the Bar, as a
routine policy.

"Extortion" consists of "control over the

property of another" by threatening to "take action against
anyone."

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406(g).

"Offer[ing] to

reduce the charge from a formal to a private reprimand if [Mr.
Black] made restitution [of what we are at a loss to know]
within thirty (30) days" (see e.g., letter of Honarvar to
Petitioner dated March 24, 1992, attached hereto as Exhibit "I")
fits the definition, perfectly.

Rule 8.4, Rules of Professional

Conduct, Utah State Bar, provides:
IT IS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT FOR A LAWYER TO:
(a) . . . . KNOWINGLY ASSIST OR INDUCE ANOTHER
TO [VIOLATE THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT],
OR DO SO THROUGH THE ACTS OF ANOTHER.
Trost knows that it is unethical for a lawyer to agree to pay
the health care costs of his client.

14

He so acknowledged in his

Memorandum dated April 27, 1993 attached hereto as Exhibit "H."
Despite that knowledge, the entire effort of Trost and Honarvar
in these proceedings has been to force Petitioner, under threat
of disciplinary proceedings, to pay a claim which Petitioner
could not pay because it would be unethical for him to do so,
and which Trost and Honarvar acknowledged knowing would be
unethical.
17.

Petitioner, and his counsel, state that in their

combined experience of more than seventy (70) years as
practicing lawyers they have never witnessed a more inept
display than that of Honarvar in these proceedings.

The tape

recording will show that she began the proceedings by presenting
her final argument, before she had presented any evidence and
without making an opening statement.

Counsel for Petitioner

stipulated to the authenticity of four documents referred to in
her final (opening) argument, even though they were not in
evidence, consisting of the disputed document signed by
Petitioner, two letters from Petitioner to his client, and a
so-called medical report which are probative of nothing.
Honarvar then rested, without presenting any evidence.

The

incompetence of Honarvar and Trost should be a source of
embarrassment to the Board, but it's relevance to this Petition
is that it disregards Petitioner's right to due process, the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence in particular.
18.

Petitioner submits that neither Trost nor Honarvar are

qualified, by temperment or ability, to occupy public office,
particularly a public office as sensitive as that of Bar
15

Counsel.

Neither of them have a proper grasp of the nature and

purpose of rules of ethics, of a lawyer's fiduciary duty to his
client, that disciplinary proceedings are abused when they are
employed to enforce civil disputes of third parties involving
lawyers, of the meaning of concepts like "restitution," and that
threatening public reprimand unless a lawyer complies with a
demand by Bar Counsel that payments be made to satisfy contract
claims of third parties is a pure act of extortion.

More

seriously, neither Trost nor Honarvar have any grasp of the role
of a public prosecutor, which was defined by Mr. Justice Jackson
in Berger

v.

United

States,

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934), when he

declared that the prosecutor
is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest . . . is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law. . . . He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.
Petitioner therefore submits that Trost and Honarvar should be
relieved of their positions as Bar Counsel and Assistant Bar
Counsel, respectively.

Trost and Honarvar have displayed a mean

spirited, highly partisan, "win at any cost" approach to
disciplinary matters that is improper and positively evil.

Other

persons should be appointed to those positions who have a proper
ethical sense, or outside counsel having a proper sense should be
16
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utilized on an ad hoc basis.
19.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action
or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith. . . .

We submit that the facts of this matter present a compelling case
of bad faith litigation within the meaning of the foregoing
statute and that bad faith damages should be awarded against Trost
and Honarvar.
20.

Petitioner requests a hearing before the Board, and the

right to present oral argument before the entire Board, pursuant
to Rule XII(f), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar (as
amended through July 1, 1987).
Wherefore, Petitioner prays
A.

That Petitioner be granted a hearing before the Board on

this Petition.
B.

That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Recommendation of the Hearing Panel dated June 18, 1993 and the
Order Affirming Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline dated June 24, 1993 be vacated and
the Complaint herein dismissed.
C.

In the alternative, that said Findings and Order be

modified or amended to reflect that Petitioner was guilty of no
unethical conduct, or that there was no clear and convincing
evidence of unethical conduct, or both.
D.

Censuring Trost and Honarvar, including the award of

damages against them for bad faith litigation.
17
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E.

Relieving Trost and Honarvar of their positions as Bar

Counsel and Assistant Bar Counsel, respectively.
DATED this 9th day of July, 1993.

rker M. Nielson
Attorney for Petitioner
Having read the foregoing Petition for (1) Amendment,
Modification or Reconsideration, and to Vacate the Order Affirming
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of
Discipline, and (2) for Sanctions Against Bar Counsel and
Assistant Bar Counsel, I affirm that all matters stated therein
are true, other than matters stated on information and belief as
to which I believe them to be true and correct.

^

^ J o h n L. Black, Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the original and one copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR (1) AMENDMENT, MODIFICATION OR
RECONSIDERATION, AND TO VACATE THE ORDER AFFIRMING FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE, AND (2)
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST BAR COUNSEL AND ASSISTANT BAR COUNSEL, were
hand delivered to:
John Baldwin, Director
Office of Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar Association
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and copies were hand delivered to:
James Clegg, President
Utah State Bar Association
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Paul T. Moxley, President-Elect
Utah State Bar Association
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
201 South Main #1300
One Utah Center
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Stephen A. Trost
Office of Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar Association
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Nayer H. Honarvar
Office of Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar Association
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

this 9th day of July, 1993.

(0067)
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. - #5352
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Utah State Bar
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
•In the Matter of the Complaint
by:
C M . WILKERSON
against

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND ENFORCE
RULE 4, RULES OF LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY AND
IN SUPPORT OF ORDER OF
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND

JOHN L. BLACK
DOB: 08-25-23
ADM: 06-12-52

The

NO. 930594

Utah

State

Bar hereby

submits

the following

Memorandum in Response to Mr. Black's Suggestion of Mootness and
Motion to Dismiss and Enforce Rule 4, Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability and in Response to his Memorandum in Opposition to
Order of Discipline:

Public Reprimand:
PROCEDURAL SETTING

Pending
Discipline:

before

the court

is a proposed

Order of

Public Reprimand against attorney John L. Black.

This proceeding has become unnecessarily complicated procedurally

KIPP M O CHRISTIAN PC
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but, as will be shown below, is properly before this court for
final action.
On June 18, 1993, a hearing panel of the Utah State Bar
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with a recommendation

of discipline

against Mr. Black.

The Utah State Bar

Commission affirmed the hearing panel Findings and Conclusions on
or about June 24, 1993.
Effective July 1, 1993, this court ordered new Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability. A problem arose because, under
the old rules, Mr. Black had a right to petition within 10 days
the

Bar

Commission

to

amend,

modify,

or

reconsider

under

Rule XII(f) the recommendation entered June 24, 1993 by the Bar
Commission, but the new rules removed Bar Commission jurisdiction
as of July 1, 1993.
On July 19, 1993, the Office of Attorney Discipline
filed a Motion for Clarification with this court asking the court
to clarify the procedural status of the case. On or about August
17, 1993, this court granted leave for Mr. Black to file an appeal
of the recommendation of discipline with the Utah Supreme Court.
This court also denied a Petition for Extraordinary Writ which Mr.
Black had filed with the court.
This court's Order of August 17, 1993, had the effect of
curing the questions raised by the adoption of the new rules so
that Mr. Black could file his appeal.

For reasons known only to

Mr. Black and his counsel, the appeal was never filed.

Bar

counsel, by letter, reminded Mr. Black, through his counsel, of

the need to follow through on the appeal but none has been made to
this date.

See Exhibit "A".

No appeal of the recommendation having been filed with
this court, the Utah State Bar then took the next appropriate step
of certifying on or about December 10, 1993, that the Utah Supreme
Court could review the proposed recommendation and enter an Order
of Discipline.
Mr. Black then filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the
Order of Discipline and further challenged the appointment of
outside counsel to act as Bar counsel along with a Motion to
Dismiss.

The purpose of this Memorandum is to reply to all

pending points raised by Mr. Black rather than file a collection
of memoranda in response to the various pleadings filed.
ARGUMENT
A.

Counsel are Not Disqualified

Mr. Black argues that under Rule 4 of the new Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability outside counsel are disqualified
from acting in the stead of Bar counsel.

This is a matter of

first impression but, fortunately, the plain language of the
applicable rules and common sense lead to a conclusion that the
outside counsel are not disqualified.
A review of Rule 4, specifically, and the current Rules
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, generally, does not lead to
the conclusion that one has a right to a particular person acting
as disciplinary counsel.

An examination of the structure of the

-3-
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rules shows that outside counsel

can

so act in appropriate

circumstances as disciplinary counsel.
For example, Rule 1 provides that the rule should be
construed so as to achieve substantial justice and fairness with
dispatch and at the least expense to all concerned parties.

The

rule further provides that the interest of the public, the courts,.
and the legal profession be taken into consideration and that the
rules be construed to secure the just and speedy resolution of
every complaint.
Rule 2 provides that disciplinary counsel means the
counsel appointed by the Board of Bar Commissioners and includes
other counsel employed to assist appointed counsel.
Rule 4 provides the Board of Commissioners shall appoint
the

chief

disciplinary

counsel.

The

rule

then

contains a

prohibition that the chief disciplinary counsel nor any full-time
staff disciplinary counsel engage in the private practice of law.
Nothing in that language limits the ability of the Bar to hire
outside counsel and the ability of the outside counsel to engage
in the general practice of law. Rule 4(b)(6) invoked by Mr. Black
clearly was intended to be part of a list of duties and responsibilities of the chief disciplinary counsel.

There is nothing in

that rule which indicates that outside counsel cannot be utilized
in an appropriate situation.
An examination of the record before this court shows
that this is an appropriate situation

for the employment of

outside counsel. Reading of Mr. Black's Memorandum in Opposition
-470

to the Order of Discipline shows that he claims that Bar counsel
and the staff conspired against him in "shocking disregard of
fundamental fairness and due process", made false certifications,
and generally threatened and engaged in other personal activity
that was wrongful.
If one were to follow the logic of Mr. Black, almost
nobody could act as disciplinary counsel under the circumstances.
He claims that the staff of the Utah State Bar, including the
president of the Bar, the executive director, the disciplinary
counsel, and supporting staff, are all engaged in a conspiracy to
deny him his rights.

He would have them all disqualified from

participating in the disciplinary process.

When the Utah State

Bar takes the commendable action of removing themselves from the
proceeding so as to preserve fairness, Mr. Black claims that
nobody is qualified if they are engaged in the private practice of
law.

Simple logic leads one to conclude that only attorneys who

work for government or who are not practicing law at all could act
as counsel where the Bar disciplinary counsel is disqualified.
There is no apparent legal reason to adopt the strained interpretation.
In fact, there is no prohibition in the rules to the Bar
retaining outside counsel to act.

The actions of the Utah State

Bar in retaining outside counsel are completely consistent with
the mandate in Rule 1 to construe the rules towards the speedy and
effective administration of justice. Absent any specific prohibi-

-5KJPPAWO CHRISTIAN PC
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tion on retaining outside counsel, the arguments that are proposed
should be rejected.
B.

This Court has Jurisdiction

Mr. Black argues in his opposition to the Order of
Discipline that this court lacks jurisdiction to impose the Order.
This argument is patently incorrect. This court explained in some
detail in Bailev v. Utah State Barr 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993),
that this court has the inherent power to regulate the practice of
law through Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution.
Contrary to the allegation that this court does not have jurisdiction, it is the very source of jurisdiction over attorneys in
disciplinary proceedings.
Mr. Black raises a number of procedural points in an
attempt to show the court that jurisdiction does not exist. These
points are not well founded, but require a brief response.
Mr. Black first argues that the proceedings are untimely
and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not
presented "forthwith" as required by former Rule XII(g). In fact,
the procedural history shows that the Utah State Bar always
pressed the resolution of this action forward and was, admittedly,
delayed while the question of the effect of the new rules was
considered.

There is no evidence in the record that any unusual

delay was incurred because of the failure of the Utah State Bar to
act.

The argument is also inconsistent with his other that the

bar acted too fast in forwarding the recommendation to this court.

-6-
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Next, Mr. Black argues that Bar counsel did not have the
express direction of the Bar Ethics and Discipline Committee to
conduct proceedings.

There is no amplification of this point

contained in the Black memorandum.

There is a presumption in law

that proceedings are regular until someone presents evidence to
the contrary. Cf., Ferro v. Utah Dept- of Commerce. 828 P.2d 507
(Utah App. 1992); Van Sickle v. Boye^r 797 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1990).
The argument should be rejected summarily.
Next, Mr. Black claims that because of the "reprehensible practice"
required

of the Bar counsel that there was no service as

upon him.

While no one would

argue that maximum

disclosure is desirable, the argument that somehow the proceeding
is void for lack of service is misplaced.
First, however he found out, it is clear that Black has
actual notice of the pending Order.

The Affidavit of Parker

Nielsen attached to the Memorandum before this court describes the
circumstances

of

learning

that

there

was

a pending

Order.

Consequently, even if one were to assume that some rule was
violated, no prejudice has been shown.
amounts to harmless error.

Failure to show prejudice

In re Disciplinary Action of McCune.

717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986).
Next, the failure of Mr. Black to enter his appeal after
the court's Order allowing the same several months ago constitutes
a waiver of additional notice.

One searches in vain through the

Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability to find a requirement
that the proposed Order be served upon Mr. Black. Rule 14 of the
-7
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new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability suggest that one
look to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for such a requirement.
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
general service of papers in connection with litigation but
creates an exception for the requirement of service where parties
are in default. Failure to make the required appeal is tantamount
to a default and the opposing side may assume that no opposition
is made to entering an order. See In re JuddP 629 P.2d 694 (Utah
1981).
Rule XII, under the old rules, provides for a routine
process by which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with a
Recommendation are entered by the Board of Bar Commissioners and
transmitted routinely to the Utah Supreme Court. The requirement
for service should be interpreted in the context of the proceeding
that

is at issue.

These proceedings are not routine court

proceedings but are qu~: i-administrative in that the Bar is acting
as an extension of the Utah Supreme Court.
Additionally, Rule XIV(b) of the former rules, in effect
when this proceeding commenced, simply provided for the court to
enter an order approving and adopting the findings, conclusions
and recommendations of the Board of Bar Commissioners where there
has been no appeal and a review by the Supreme Court shows that
there is no cause to act contrary to the recommendation rendered.
The usual procedure for submitting an order without
sending a copy to the respondent is not defective for other
reasons.

K I P P A N O C H R I S T I A N PC

First, carrying the administrative analogy forward, it

is basic law that the agency need not submit the order to a party
before it is actually entered.

See 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative

Law § 471. Similarly, any requirement the party be advised of the
actual notice has been satisfied by the notice of this court of
hearing set for February 7, 1994 to consider the order.
What Black really objects to is the timing of the notice
rather than the existence of the notice.

As he has had ample

notice in this court and actually filed an objection, no error
attaches.
Mr. Black should be charged with the knowledge that the
Utah State Bar will follow the regular and routine procedure set
forth in published rules and forward the Recommendation and
proposed order to this court. This argument has particular force
because Bar counsel advised counsel for Mr. Black by letter that
a formal order was going to be submitted unless a Notice of Appeal
was filed.

See Exhibit

,f ,f

A .

Finally, the argument that failure to serve voids the
proposed action elevates form over substance. Even when there is
a default

judgment, the failure to give proper notice of a

judgment does not invalidate the default judgment where a party
learns of the default in time to act against the

judgment.

Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838
P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992).

Similarly, where Black has known of

the proposed order for several weeks now, the complaint about
service is exalting form over substance.

-9-
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evidence that he had time to overcome any defect in notice and has
made what he views to be an appropriate response.
Black next argues that appellate jurisdiction is not
invoked and relies on Title 78 governing the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. This argument ignores entirely Article VIII
of the Utah Constitution and the implementing case law, such as
Baileyf discussed above. The review by the Utah Supreme Court of
a Bar disciplinary recommendation is not an appeal in the same
sense as with civil litigation.

What the Utah Supreme Court

reviews under the old rules is a recommendation, not a final
judgment.

The term "appeal" is used in a loose sense

to really

refer to review by this court and resulting order upon the
recommendation by the Bar. The reliance upon Title 78 concerning
appeals of civil actions is misplaced.
Mr. Black next argues that the proceedings before the
State Bar are not concluded because the Bar Commission did not
specifically

consider

Recommendation.

his

Petition

to

Modify

or

Amend

the

This argument fails because the effect of the

July 1, 1993, implementation of the new rules was to deprive the
Bar Commission of any jurisdiction to act further on the case.
This Court's subsequent order in August, 1993 retained the right
of appeal to this Court but did not reserve the jurisdiction of
the Bar Commission to reconsider under the old rules. While Mr.
Black may believe that it would have been more appropriate to have
the Bar Commission act first, what happened was that the door for
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full review by the Supreme Court was opened to him so that no harm
resulted when jurisdiction was lost by the Bar Commission.
Mr. Black also argues that the Bar counsel is precluded
from filing the proposed Order of Discipline by the doctrines of
estoppel, latches, and waiver.

The basic principles of law

advanced are not in disagreement.

The argument fails on factual

grounds.

As reviewed above, the Utah State Bar has pressed this

matter forward with dispatch considering all the circumstances.
There was a brief period of uncertainty concerning the effect of
the new rules but that was resolved by the Order of this court.
The resulting delay has been caused by the failure of Mr. Black to
take the necessary step to obtain review even after receiving the
reminder to do so from the Bar counsel.

There is no evidence of

any reliance by Mr. Black to his detriment on any representation
of the Utah State Bar or of prejudice worked against him by any
delay.

It is significant that his Memorandum does not talk in

terms of prejudice other than to make reference to legal expenses
associated with bringing an Extraordinary Writ that was dismissed
because it was inappropriate.

Absent a showing of prejudice or

detrimental reliance, the legal principles of estoppel, latches,
and waiver do not apply. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d
695 (Utah 1976).
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CONCLUSION
Before this court is a record of regularly conducted
proceedings resulting in a recommendation of the Board of Bar
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar that attorney John Black be
disciplined.

Some delay was experienced because of the implemen-

tation of new rules, but Black failed to take appropriate steps to
protect his interest by seeking further review of this court once
the door had been opened to him.

A reading of the memoranda he

has filed with this court shows that none of them deal with the
substantive

issue of whether Black ought to be disciplined.

Instead, a variety of procedural complaints combined with charges
of misconduct of Bar officials is made. This Memorandum has shown
that none of the procedural objections are valid.

Black makes no

showing of any misconduct on the substantive question of whether
he ought to be disciplined.

Absent such a showing, what remains

before this court is a clear recommendation that discipline be
imposed without apparent reason for this court to do otherwise.
This court
procedural objections

is respectfully
raised

requested to reject the

by Mr. Black and to enter the

proposed Order of Discipline.
DATED this 27th day of January, 1994.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

CARMAN
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ.
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Utah State Bar
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CERTIFICATE OF HAMD DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of January, 1994,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND
RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS AND MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ENFORCE RULE 4, RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY AND IN
SUPPORT OF ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:

PUBLIC REPRIMAND to be hand

delivered, to the following:
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
Attorney at Law
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

"

>

/

^

BJL*\aU£*\K£*ORJUrD. 5
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Utah§tateBar
Offlc* of Attorney Discipline
645 South 200 East. Suite 205 • Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 3834
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • FAX: (801) 531-0660 • WATS: 1 -800 698 9077

Sttpfccn A. Trott

October 20, 1993

P. Otjfy Ftrrt*o
N i y t r H. Hontrvtr
W * f x M K. Smith

Boyd Bryan

Parker Nielson, Esq.
655 S. 200 E.
S.L.C., UT 84111
REi

John L. Black, P-557

Dear Mr. Nielsoni
As you know, the Utah Supreme Court on August 16,
1993, in response to my Motion for Clarification, granted
"leave for respondent to file an appeal with this court."
Although the Supreme Court did not require a Notice of
Appeal to be filed within the customary 30 day period,
nonetheless, I presumed you would.
It has now been in
excess of 60 days since the Court entered their order and
I would like to move this case along.
To that end I'm enclosing a copy of Rule XIV of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar that were in
effect until July 1, 1993. As you can see the respondent
is required to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of
being served the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation
of the Board • The Board served the same on about June 29,
1993 by mailing a copy to you.
If you would rather have the Supreme Court enter an
order on the Board's order and proceed with the appeal
thereafter, I have prepared the same for your approval as
to form.
In short, I have no preference as to which
procedural course you choose to take, I simply want to
conclude this case.
Sincerelyi

JVbjJka.&3~~
SATtclf
Enclosure

Stephen A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
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Stephen A. Trost, #3286
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
Office of Attorney Discipline
645 S. 200 B.
SLC, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of
the Complaint by
C M . WILKERSON

1
1

ORDER OF DISCIPLINES
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

1

F- 557

against
JOHN t,. BLACK
DOB: 08-25-23
ADM: 06-12-52

Having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Disciplinary Hearing
Panel Committee of the Utah State Bar dated June 18, 1993, and
having reviewed the Order of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar dated June 24, 1993, this Court, being fully advised in
the premises, orders and decrees as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Order of the Board of Bar
Commisslohers affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced Hearing
panel be and the same hereby is approved.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline of the above-referenced
Hearing Panel be and the same hereby is incorporated herein as
though fully set forth.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Respondent, JOHN L. BLACK, be
and he hereby is disciplined for conduct unbecoming a member of the
Utah State Bar as followsi
1.
in

the

That Respondent shall make restitution to C M . Wllkerson
amount

of

$1,635.91

or

the

outstanding

balance

of

Wilkerson'8 bill, whichever is less within thirty (30) days from
the entry of this order.
2.

That Respondent shall be PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED.

DATED this

day of

, 1993.
UTAH SUPREME COURT

Gordon R. Hall
Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart
Justice

Richard C. Howe
Associate Chief Justice
, Christine M. Durham
Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman
Justice

Approved as to form*
Parker M, Nielson

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order of Discipline was mailed postage pre-paid to Parker M.
Nielson, Attorney for Respondent at 655 South 200 East, S.L.C., UT
84111 on this
day of
, 1993.

Stephen Trost, #3286
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
645 South 200 East
SLC, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In The Matter of
Complaint by

) MOTION TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS
) RELATED TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION
) FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SANCTIONS

C M . Wilkerson
against
John L. Black
DOB: 05-25-93
ADM: 06-12-52

)
]

Case No. F-557

]
)
]

COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through,
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and hereby moves this
Board pursuant to Rule 40(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
continue further proceedings in the above-captioned cause until the
Utah Supreme Court rules on the Office of Attorney Discipline's
Motion for Clarification filed on July 19, 1993.
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A Memorandum in support accompanies this motion,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 1993,

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

By:
Stephen A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS was mailed postage prepaid to Parker
Nielson, at 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 and to H. James Clegg
at P.O.

Box

45000, S.L.C.,

UT

84145 on this

/ 7

day of

, 1993.

84

Certificate of Hand-Delivery

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS was hand-delivered to John Baldwin,
at
T"

r

655

S.

200

E.,

S.L.C.,

UT

84111

on

this

/^

day of

, 1993.
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Stephen Trost, #3286
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
645 South 200 East
SLC, UT 84111-3834
801-531-9110

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In The Matter of
Complaint by

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO CONTINUE

C M , Wilkerson
Case No. F-557
against
John L. Black
DOB: 05-25-93
ADM; 06-12-52

COMES NOW the Office of Attorney Discipline, by and through,
Stephen A. Trost, Chief Disciplinary Counsel and respectfully
submits this Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Continue.
The Respondent's counsel in the above-captioned case served
(among others) the Executive Director of the Bar on July 9, 1993
with

a

"Petition

for

(1)

Amendment,

Modification

or

Reconsideration, And to Vacate the Order Affirming Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommendation of Discipline, And (2)

86

For Sanctions Against Bar Counsel And Bar Counsel" citing Rule
XII(f) of the former rules of procedure.
However by the Supreme Court's Minute Entry of May 28, 1993
the new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability were adopted as
of

June

30, 1993 abolishing

henceforth the role of the Bar

Commission in disciplinary cases.

Thus it would appear that the

Board lacks jurisdiction to hear the Respondent's petition.

If

this were the only minute entry by the Supreme Court there would be
little to question as to procedure.

But on June 29, 1993 the

Supreme Court entered another Minute Entry requiring the removal to
the district courts of all formal disciplinary cases "which have
not yet been heard by the hearing panels."

Since in this case a

hearing panel did hear the case, it apparently can't go forward
because of the June 29, 1993 Minute Entry nor go back (to the Bar
Commission following the former rules) because jurisdiction was
negated by the May 28, 1993 Minute Entry.
To rescue this case from the procedural black hole it fell
into, the Office of Attorney Discipline filed with the Supreme
Court on July 19, 1993 the attached Motion for Clarification.
Accordingly, the Office of Attorney Discipline, submits that
good cause exists for the Bar Commission to continue without date

MEMORANDUM - PAGE -2-

proceedings in this case until the Supreme Court responds to the
Motion for Clarification.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 1993.

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

MdUr^A^^J

By:

Steptyen A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT was mailed postage prepaid to Parker Nielson,
at 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 and to H. James Clegg at P.O.
Box 45000, S.L.C., UT 84145 on this
1993.

/^f

day of

/

2257
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Certificate of Hand-Delivery

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT was hand-delivered to John Baldwin, at 655 S.
200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 on this J6/

day of

^x^L^L.-

, 1993.
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Utah State Bar
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of the Complaint
by:

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN C. BALDWIN

C M . WILKERSON
against
JOHN L. BLACK
DOB: 08-25-23
ADM: 06-12-52

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

NO. 930594
F-557

)
: SS,
)

Affiant, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar and

was during the year 1993.

One of my responsibilities during 1993

was to act as the Clerk of the Disciplinary Court.
2.

Attached is a copy of the Certificate of Readiness

for Supreme Court Review which Mr. Black complains was not executed
by myself.

In fact, I did not sign the certificate and it was

signed by a deputy clerk whose responsibility it was to assemble
documents concerning all disciplinary actions, when requested, to

Exhibit "U*
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the Utah Supreme Court.

I delegated those routine administrative

procedures to this deputy clerk.
3.

This deputy clerk was authorized to sign my name on

administrative documents.

I accept responsibility for what was

signed under my authorization.
4.

The Certificate of Readiness is a standard form which

is routinely processed as part of the record of disciplinary action
and was not created specifically for the John Black matter. I have
been since told that the statement that the respondent had not
filed a Petition for Reconsideration is in error and appears to be
the result of the deputy clerk executing a standard form without
detailed review thereof.
DATED this

day of July, 1994.

jtf&N C.~ BALDWIN
On t h i s

(V y

<k

>day of

l

., 1994, before me

, a Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah, personally appeared John C. Baldwin known to me
to be the person(s) who executed the within affidavit and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes therein
stated.

/

My Commission Expires:

Od 11 m

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

4b4fc*MMta
IVDMEW.KUMRC
Notary Pubic
SKATE OF UTAH

Mr Comm. & * * « OCT 4. \W\
6463200ESLCUT M i l l

ww**w

mmm w i
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
3 32 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
August 16, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Parker M. Nielson
Attorney at Law
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT

In re:

84111

Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability

Nc. 920334

In response to motion for clarification, the court grants
leave for respondent to file an appeal with this court.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

Exhibit "V"
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-00O00-

Regular February Term, 1994

February 7, 1994

In re: John L. Black, F-557
Supreme Court Number 93 0594

MINUTE ENTRY

The Utah State Bar's motion to ratify the disciplinary
action of John Black is denied and respondent's motion to
dismiss is granted with directions to the Bar to process the
complaint against Mr. Black under the new rules of
professional conduct.

For the Court

^D
I. Daniel Stewart
Associate Chief Justice
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN L. BLACK,
MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF AMENDED
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEPHEN A. TROST, NAYER H.
HONARVAR, H. JAMES CLEGG, JOHN
C. BALDWIN, and the UTAH STATE
BAR,

Civil No. 930905141CV
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

Defendants hereby submit the following Memorandum in
Support of their Motion to Dismiss:
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of disciplinary action proposed
against attorney John L. Black by the Utah State Bar pursuant to
its responsibilities as the first line disciplinary agent of the
Utah Supreme Court.

Mr. Black had a formal disciplinary hearing

which was decided adversely to him, on or about June 24, 1993.
KIPP A»O CHRISTIAN. PC.
ATTOBMCV* AT LAW
PITY C t N T I I I I . f } 3 0

E x h i b i t "X'
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Effective July 1, 1993 by order of the Utah Supreme
Court, new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability were adopted.
A problem arose because, under the old rules, Mr. Black had a
right to appeal the adverse decision directly to the supreme
court. He perceived his right to appeal had disappeared under the
new rules before his time to appeal under the old rules had run.
Mr. Black then filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ with the
Utah Supreme Court.
M

A" hereto.

A copy of that Writ is attached as Exhibit

Note that the Petition originally had many pages of

exhibits which have been omitted for convenience of review in this
proceeding.
The Utah Supreme Court, by Order dated August 16, 1993,
denied the Petition for Extraordinary Writ.

See Exhibit "B".

Mr. Black, who does not acknowledge that he did anything
to merit discipline, filed this Petition requesting sanctions and
monetary damages against the defendants.
An

examination

of

the Amended

Petition

shows that

plaintiff engages in an analytical exercise whereby he makes up
his own rules governing the procedure which should be followed in
these circumstances and then asks this court to grant extraordinary relief when the Utah State Bar does not respond as he thinks
they ought.

-2KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, PC. j
A T T O f t N C Y S AT CAW
CITY CCNTMI X. # 3 3 0
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STANDARD OP REVIEW
A Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is
typically resolved by applying the standard that the Motion should
be granted where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief under any stated facts which could
be proved in support of the claim*

Christei?sen v. Lei is Automatic

Transmission Serv,, Inc., 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970). The court has
discretion to consider matters outside the pleadings.

Strand v.

Associated Students, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). Matters considered
outside the pleadings require application of the standard of
review for a Motion for Summary Judgment.
P.2d 905 (Utah 1975).

Harvey v. Sanders, 534

Applying that standard, once the moving

party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
the responding party has an obligation to affirmatively show that
there are facts in issue or the motion may be resolved as a matter
of law.

D&L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989).
ANALYSIS
A.
When

one

There is No Dispute Here
cuts

through

the

various

allegations of

wrongdoing and gets to the heart of the plaintiff's request for
extraordinary relief, it becomes apparent there is no meaningful
dispute.

The heart of this dispute is that Mr. Black wants a

special prosecutor appointed to investigate and pursue alleged
wrongful conduct of the Bar counsel.

As can be seen from the

attached Affidavit of John Baldwin, the Bar has, in fact, made

-3K I P P A N O C H R I S T I A N PC.
A T T O M N C Y l AT LAW
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such a request to the Utah Supreme Court.

He then complains that

this contact was improper and seeks monetary damages.
A review of the Petition shows that a major portion of
his complaint is that Mr. Black does not believe the state Bar has
acted quickly enough.

A reading of his Petition in this case

along with the Baldwin Affidavit shows that his Petition for
sanctions against the Bar counsel was filed on or about July 9,
1993, only one week after the new rules took effect and eliminated
authority of the Board of Bar Commissioners to act as a tribunal.
His request that a special counsel be appointed was not filed
until August 18, 1993.
1993.

This Petition was filed on September 8,

Mr. Black allowed only twenty-one calendar days after

requesting special counsel be appointed before he thought it
appropriate to complain to this court.
A review of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, attached

as Exhibit "C11, shows that there are no time

requirements imposed upon the Utah State Bar to obtain appointment
of a special counsel. Mr. Black seeks, through this Petition, to
make up his own time limitation rule and enforce it through order
of this court.
One cannot ignore that this Petition fails because, as
the Baldwin Affidavit shows, the Utah State Bar has already done
what the Petition seeks.

That is, the Utah State Bar has

approached the Utah Supreme Court with a request for appointment
of special counsel.

The very language of Rule 65B provides that

extraordinary relief is appropriate where there is

K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN. PC.
ATTOMNCrl AT LAW
II
CITY C t N T H f I , I 3 J O
I
• - - » * • • * -Artrt «OuTH
II

w

no other

Q ~
-? /

plain, speedy and adequate remedy11.

Obviously, where the relief

sought by the plaintiff has already been accomplished, there is
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Similarly, though Utah has apparently not specifically
yet addressed the question, other states have held it fundamental
that one seeking to order another to act pursuant to an extraordinary writ must fail where the act has already been accomplished.
Draper v. State. 621 P.2d 1142 (Okla. 1980); Kay v. David Douglas
School Dist. #40, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987).
Put another way, the claim made herein is moot.
\

The

desired request was timely made by the Bar and any further
complaint at this point would

amount to

nothing

more than

requesting the district court to order the supreme court to act
quicker.
B.

The Second Cause of Action States No Recognized Claia
An examination of the amendment to the original Petition

for Extraordinary Relief shows that Mr. Black is essentially
complaining that John Baldwin, executive director of the Utah
State Bar, violated Rule 3.5(c) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct in that he sent a letter to the Utah Supreme Court, dated
September 13, 1993 requesting appointment of a Special Counsel.
While the act complained of is clear, the nature of the cause of
action alleged is not clear.
No legal authority is cited for the proposition that
violation of a Bar rule somehow creates a cause of action.
Allegation number 29, which cites various federal and state
-5KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN. PC
A T T O R N C Y S AT LAW
CITY C C N T f f C X . # 3 3 0
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constitution provisions, along with the most recent rules of
lawyer discipline and disability, similarly fails to identify a
recognized

cause of

action.

Defendants

are placed

in the

procedurally awkward position of having to respond to a negative.
Defendants cannot be required to run through a list of potential
torts or constitutional claims to discover if something fits the
allegation made.
The courts have correctly placed the burden on the
plaintiff to at least plead a recognized cause of action.

A

complaint is required to give fair notice of the nature and basis
of the claim to avoid dismissal. Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Boschf
475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970).

The complaint, here Petition, is then

viewed in light of whether the allegations made would establish
that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any stated
facts which could be proved in support of the claim.
Control Comm'n v. Athas. 243 P.2d 441 (1952).

Liquor

Applying those

standards, there is no recognized cause of action pled in the
Second Cause of Action.
The second major problem with the Amended Petition is
that it assumes that the letter from Baldwin to the Utah Supreme
Court is an ex parte communication.

That conclusion is incorrect

because it ignores the reality of how the system is structured in
disciplinary proceedings.
First, it must be kept in mind that the communication
arises out of a request for special counsel to be appointed to
investigate alleged improprieties of the Bar counsel.

It is not

-699

a communication concerning the substantive merits of the disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Black.

The communication relates

to only whether a proceeding

to commence

ought

against Bar

counsel. Mr. Black is not a party to a disciplinary proceeding of
the Bar Counsel any more than, by analogy, a victim in a criminal
proceeding is a party to the criminal prosecution case.
Second, the relationship between the Utah State Bar and
the Utah Supreme Court in Bar disciplinary proceedings is not the
relationship between a party and a judge in court proceedings.
The Utah State Bar is not an association of attorneys, but is an
^vtension of the Utah Supreme Court that functions in a quasijudicial capacity. These principles were explained in some detail
in Bailey v. Utah State Barr 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993).

As the

court explained there, the Utah Supreme Court has inherent power
to regulate the practice of law and has also received affirmation
of that power through Article VIII, Section

4 of the Utah

Constitution.
Bailey

explains

that

the

court

has

delegated

its

regulatory and disciplinary duties to the Utah State Bar through
the procedures of discipline.

Rules 1 and 10 of the Rules of

Lawyer Discipline and Disability clearly provide that the legal
basis through which disciplinary
appointment of the State Bar.

proceedings are held is by

Initial discipline activity which

supreme court justices obviously are not procedurally positioned
to do personally is formally delegated to the Bar.

See Exhibit

"C".
-7100

The communication of Baldwin to the supreme court cannot
be labelled an ex parte communication

when Baldwin acts, in

effect, as an agent of the supreme court in administering State
Bar procedure.

The letter is nothing more than an internal

communication to which no particular procedural rights attach.
C

Defendants are Immune From Liability

A third reason that the Amended Petition fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted is that the defendants
are protected by quasi-judicial immunity.

The Bailey case arose

out of a lawsuit brought against the Utah State Bar for failure to
protect the plaintiffs against the incompetence of a member of the
Bar.

The Utah Supreme Court explained with clarity that the Bar

itself and those participating in the process are immune from
civil liability.
As with Bailey, Mr. Clark cannot here seek monetary
damages in any form against these defendants.

A reading of the

Amended Petition shows that the wrongful acts alleged all arose
out of the function of participating in the disciplinary process.
Consequently# even if the standard of construing the Petition in
favor of the petitioner is applied, these defendants are immune
from the claim for monetary damages as a matter of law.
D.

Attorney's Fees are Mot Available

Passing mention should be made of the request for relief
for attorney's fees.

It is curious that in a Petition which

alleges that certain attorneys failed to follow appropriate rules
-8KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, PC.
ATTONNCTl AT LAW
CITY C I X T » « X. § 3 3 0
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that a request for attorney's fees, which is clearly against all
established law in Utah, would be included.

Utah law was settled

long ago to the effect that attorney's fees may not be recovered
unless provided for by statute or by contract.
Brinahurstf 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972).

B&R Supply Co. v.

Plaintiff identifies no

contract or statute that would allow Mr. Black an award of
attorney's fees even if he was able to state some cause of action.
CONCLUSION
The court is respectfully requested to dismiss the
Petition for Extraordinary Relief on the grounds that the entire
claim is moot and no justiciable claim is stated.

A request has

been made by the Utah State Bar to the Utah Supreme Court to
appoint

special counsel and no legal basis exists for this

Petition to move forward.

Additionally, these defendants are

immune from suits seeking monetary damages.

There is no legal

reason to proceed.
DATED this 22

day of October, 1993.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

CARMAN EC^tPP, ESQ.
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendants

-9KIPP ANOCHRISTIAN PC
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the {Jv

< /

<day of September,

1993, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

lM\KJtfX\mMORA*D. 1
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Utah^tatcBar
Oftlc* of Attorney Dl«clplln#
645 South 200 East. Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3834
Telephone: (801) 531 9110 • FAX. (801) 531-0660 • WATS. 1-800-698-9077

June 16, 1994

John L. Black
10 W. Broadway, #500
S.L.C., UT 84101
NOTICE OP INFORMAL COMPLAINT
Dear Mr. Blacks
A complaint has been filed against you with the Ethics
and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar by Dr. C M .
Wilkerson. You have previously been provided a copy of the
complaint but another is enclosed for your convenience.
You have twenty (20) days from the receipt of this Notice
of Informal Complaint to submit an Answer as per Rule
lOfa)(5) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
Preliminary investigation by the Office of Bar Counsel
indicates that the activities described in the complaint
may constitute violations of one or more of the following
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, to
wits
1.
Rule 1.13(a), (b) and (c) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY which states that a lawyer shall hold property of clients
or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in
connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's
own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account
maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is
situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or
third person. Other property shall be identified as such
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and other property shall be kept the lawyer
and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation; (b) upon receiving funds
or other property in which a client or third person hae^ an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or
third person, except as stated in this rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property; (c) and when in the course of
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John L. Black
Page Two

representation a lawyer is in possession of property in
which both the lawyer and another person claim interests,
the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until
there is an accounting and severance of their interests.
If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests,
the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer
until the dispute is resolved; and/or
2.
Rule 8.4(c) MISCONDUCT - which states that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Our investigation indicates you may have violated
these Rules when in the course of representing Ms. Ruby
Landers for personal injuries related to her slipping on
oil and falling in the parking lot of a certain "7-11"
store located at 2102 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah on
or about July 23, 1990, you received settlement funds on or
about August 26, 1991 and failed to withhold from these
funds proceeds assigned to Dr. Wilkerson in a document
which you signed on August 20, 1990 entitled "Authorization
of Direct Payment and Doctor's Lien," a copy of which is
enclosed for your convenience, knowing that Dr. Wilkerson
would not provide a medical report as to your client's
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis without a signed lien in
his possession.
We will notify you of the date and time set for a
hearing before a Screening Panel of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee. Should you fail to respond to the
complaint, the Panel may take the view that the factual
allegations of the complaint are to be taken as true by
reason of your default.
At the Panel hearing, you will be given an opportunity
to appear and testify under oath and present witnesses in
your behalf in addition to your written response. For a
more complete description of the Proceedings before the
Screening Panel please review Rule 10(b), Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability, adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court on July 1, 1993.
If the Screening Panel recommends an admonition (under
the prior rules denominated a "private reprimand"). you
will have the right to file with the Committee Chair an
exception to the recommendation and may also, if desired,
request a hearing. If a request for a hearing is made, the
Committee Chair, or a Screening Panel chair designated by
the Committee Chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an

John L. Black
Page Three

expeditious manner, with disciplinary counsel and the
respondent having the opportunity to be present.
The Panel also has the authority to issue a Formal
Complaint. In the event the screening panel finds probable
cause to believe that there are grounds for public
discipline and that a formal complaint is merited,
disciplinary counsel shall prepare and file a formal
complaint with the district court of proper venue. See
Rule 11, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, adopted
July 1, 1993. The action shall be brought and the trial
shall be held in the county in which the alleged offense
occurred or in the county where the respondent resides or
practices law or last practiced law in Utah. The District
Court can order disbarment, suspension, a public reprimand,
probation, or dismissal of the case. In the event of a
suspension, disbarment, probation, or public reprimand,
notice will be published in the Utah State Bar Journal.
Suspension may, and disbarment shall, carry with it the
requirement that your clients be notified. The District
Court may also order restitution of money and other
sanctions they deem appropriate.
Sincerely,

<&r

J$xf£*j^ (2.

Stephen A. Trost
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
SAT:db
Enc.
cc: Dr. C M . Wilkerson
Ruby Landers
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Notice of Informal Complaint was mailed
postage pre-paid to Parker M. Nielson, Attorney for John L.
Black, at, 655 S. 200 E., S.L.C., UT 84111 this lCrJ1 day

of

^/JL

, 1994.
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CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. - #5352
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-3773

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN L. BLACK,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT TROST'S RESPONSE
(TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS

H. JAMES CLEGG, PAUL T. MOXLEY,
JOHN C. BALDWIN, STEPHEN A.
TROST and NAYER H. HONARVAR,

Civil No. 940903074CV
Judge Timothy R. Hansen

Defendants.
Defendant, Stephen A. Trost, answers Plaintiff's First
Requests for Admissions as follows:

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
1.

With respect to the allegation in f 15 of your

Answer and Counterclaim, in which it is "[d]enied that [Trost] is
a 'chief prosecutor,'" admit that Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability (1993), provides for appointment of a
"chief disciplinary counsel," that Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability (1993), provides that "Chief disciplinary
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counsel shall perform all prosecutorial functions," and that Trost
was

appointed

chief

disciplinary

counsel

pursuant

to

those

provisions.
RESPONSE: Admit subject to the qualification that the bar
counsel is not a criminal prosecutor, that the proceedings are
civil in nature.
2.

With

respect

to

f

16

of

your

Answer

and

Counterclaim, in which it is alleged that "Defendant Honarvar was
never .the agent of defendant Trost," admit that a Petition for
Extraordinary Writ, Supreme Court docket No. 930381, was served on
you on or about July 22, 1993, containing the following allegation:
E.
Respondent Nayer Honarvar ("Honarvar"
herein) is an agent of Trost, employed by and
subordinate to Trost as to matters alleged
herein.
and that the attached document marked as Exhibit "A" is a true and
correct copy of your answer, filed by your counsel herein, Gregory
J. Sanders, containing the following admission:
7.
Respondents
admit the allegations
contained in Paragraphs C, D, and E on Page 2
of the petition.
RESPONSE: Admit subject to the qualification that the use
of the term "agent of Trost" means that the admission is made in
the context of her working within the scope of her employment as a
person supervised by Trost and not as his personal agent.
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3.

With

respect

to

f

17

of

your

Answer

and

Counterclaim, in which it is alleged that the Utah State Bar "had
jurisdiction

to

enter

final

orders

concerning

discipline of

attorneys," admit that the attached Exhibit "B" is a true and
correct copy of such a final order concerning John L. Black.
RESPONSE: Admit subject to the qualification that only
the Utah Supreme Court can enter a final Order of Discipline.
4.

With respect to your denial at paragraph 33 of your

Answer and Counterclaim of the letter dated June 1, 1993, quoted in
paragraph 33 of the Complaint, admit that the letter dated June 1,
1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D," (a) is authentic,
(b) was mailed on or about the date it bears with your knowledge
and consent, and (c) was substantially the same as letters sent to
all,

or

substantially

all

persons

as

to

whom

disciplinary

complaints were then pending.
RESPONSE: Admit.
5.

With respect to your denial at paragraph 34 of your

Answer and Counterclaim, admit that the letter dated June 1, 1993,
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D," (a) is authentic, and
(b) threatened to take action as Bar Counsel and/or Assistant Bar
Counsel against John L. Black, or cause such action to be taken.
RESPONSE: Admit that the

letter

is authentic.

The

remainder of the request is denied.
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6.

With respect to your denial at paragraph 35 of your

Answer and Counterclaim, admit that (a) the Memorandum dated April
27, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "E," is authentic,
(b) bears your initials next to the words "Bar Counsel," (c) was
mailed or transmitted to its addressees on or about the date that
it bears, and (d) that you were aware, at all times subsequent to
the Memorandum,

that the

following

language

in the document

attached to the Memorandum, was contained in the Interprofessional
Code {2d Ed.)- "An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts,
medical or otherwise, incurred by a client . . . • the attorney
should not (and ethically cannot) pay for a guarantee payment of
medical services rendered to the client . . • ."
RESPONSE:
(a) Admit.
(b) Admit.
(c) Admit.
(d)

Deny for lack of personal knowledge as to what

addition was quoted.
7.

With respect to your denial at paragraph 36 of your

Answer and Counterclaim, admit that the letter of Parker M. Nielson
dated June 3, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G," was
received by you after its date, allowing normal time for mail
delivery.
4
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RESPONSE: Admit.
8.

With respect to your denial at paragraph 37 of your

Answer and Counterclaim, admit that the Notice of Trial dated June
7, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit

M

H,lf

(a) is

authentic and (b) was mailed to John L. Black, through his attorney
of Record.
RESPONSE: Admit.
9.

Admit that the Notice of Trial dated June 7, 1993,

a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "H," was not signed by
defendant John C. Baldwin.
RESPONSE: Admit
10.

With respect to your denial of the allegations of ff

48, 70 and 78 of the complaint, admit that the document attached
hereto as Exhibit "F" (a) is a true and correct copy of a proposed
Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand filed with the Utah Supreme
Court on or about December 13, 1993, (b) by defendant Stephen A.
Trost, or with his knowledge and approval, (c) was preceded by the
letter of Stephen A. Trost dated October 20, 1993, a copy of which
is attached as Exhibit "M," and (d) that the Certificate, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit

,f

C,M accompanied Exhibit "F."

RESPONSE:
(a) Admit.
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(b) Admit subject to the qualification that it was not
personally filed by defendant Trost but was part of the routine
processing of his office for which he is responsible.
(c) Admit.
(d) Deny.
10.

[sic]

With

respect

to

your

denial

of

the

allegations of f 49 of the complaint, admit that (a) a copy of John
Black's Petition for Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration in
disciplinary case No. F-557 was served on you, by mail, on or about
July 9, 1993, and (b) the Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Clarification, a coy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "J," is
an authentic copy of a document filed by you with the Utah Supreme
Court on or about July 19, 1993, containing the following statement
at page 2 thereof: "The Respondent's counsel served (among others)
the Executive Director of the Bar on July 9, 1993 with a 'Petition
for (1) Amendment, Modification or Reconsideration, And to Vacate
the Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline, And (2) For Sanctions Against Bar
Counsel and Assistant Bar Counsel' citing Rule XII(f), attached as
Exhibit C, of the former rules of procedure."
RESPONSE:
(a) Admit.
(b) Admit.
6
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11.

With respect your evasive allegation in H 54 of your

Answer and Counterclaim, neither admitting nor denying the letters
alleged at 54 of the Complaint, (a) admit that a letter dated
December 31, 1993, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "K," was
hand delivered to defendant H. James Clegg on the date that it
bears, and (b) that a letter dated December 31, 1993, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "K," was hand delivered to defendant
Paul T. Moxley on the date that it bears.
RESPONSE: Denied

for lack of personal knowledge and

because there is no evasive allegation.
12.

With respect to your allegation at 5f 53 and 57-60

of your Answer and Counterclaim the [sic] "Baldwin had no authority
to take any action after July 1, 1993" and "jurisdiction had been
removed from [defendants] by the rule change of July 1, 1993."
(a) Admit that you knew, at all material times, that if
"jurisdiction had been removed from [defendants] by the rule change
of July 1, 1993" the Board of Bar Commissioners nevertheless had
jurisdiction to dismiss, in accordance with numerous authorities
including, e.g.,

Varian-Eimac,

Inc.

v. Lamoreaux,

767 p. 2D 569, 570

(Utah App. 1989) holding that "[w]hen a matter is outside the
court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the
action."
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(b) Admit that you filed the proposed order, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "F," in December of 1993, and relied
on procedures under the rules of attorney discipline in effect
prior to July 1, 1993 in doing so*
(c) Admit that an order was signed by defendant Clegg in
a disciplinary proceeding against Donn E. Cassity on June 24, 1993.
(d) Admit that a Notice of Appeal was filed by Donn E.
Cassity in Utah Supreme Court Docket

No. 930372 on or about July

26, 1993.
(e) Admit that the Notice of Appeal by Donn E. Cassity
in Utah Supreme Court Docket No. 939372 was, by its terms, pursuant
to Rule XIV, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar as in
effect prior to July 1, 1993.
(f) Admit that you never claimed, or took the position
that there was no jurisdiction after July 1, 1993 to entertain an
appeal pursuant to Rule XIV, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar as in effect prior to July 1, 1993.
(g) Admit that the Utah Supreme Court entertained, and
decided Docket No. 930372 and noted at footnote No. 1 of its
opinion that it had jurisdiction to do so because "Bar counsel
filed this case when the prior procedures were in effect."
(h) Admit that the office of Disciplinary Counsel, and
the Board of Bar Commissioners, has continued to process the
8
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complaint against Donn Cassity pursuant to the mandate of the Utah
Supreme Court and has not taken the position

that it lacks

jurisdiction to do so because of the rule change on July 1, 1993.
RESPONSE:
(a) Deny
(b) Admitted that the proposed Order was filed. Denied
that it was done under the old rules.
(c) Admit.
(d) Admit.
(e) Admit that the notice reads as it reads. Denied so
far as the request implies the Utah State Bar took a position
concerning jurisdiction.
(f) Objection is made to the request as vague.

If the

request is asking whether the Utah State Bar took a position that
it had jurisdiction, the request is denied because the Utah State
Bar does not entertain appeals.
(g) Admit.
(h)

Objection

is made

to

this request as being a

compound question. Admitted that the Utah Supreme Court considered
the complaint against Mr. Cassity and that the Utah State Bar never
challenged the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court.

Any other

implication of this request is denied.
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13.

With respect to your denial at f 62 of your Answer

and Counterclaim, admit that the affidavit of John C. Baldwin, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "N," is authentic,
RESPONSE: Admit.
14.

With respect to your denial at ^ 66 of your Answer

and Counterclaim, admit that the Notice of Trial over the name of
John C. Baldwin dated June 7, 1993, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit nH,fl was not signed by defendant John C. Baldwin.
RESPONSE: Admit
15.

With respect to your denial at fl 68 of your Answer

and Counterclaim, admit (a) that attached Exhibit "0ff is a true and
correct copy of the certified mail receipt for the delivery of the
Order of Clegg dated June 24, 1993, and the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law & Recommendation signed by Robert S. Howell
dated June 18, 1993 and (b) that they were mailed by your office,
pursuant to your direction or with your knowledge and authority, on
June 29, 1993.
RESPONSE: Admit.
16.

With your respect to denial at f 82 of your Answer

and Counterclaim, admit

(a) that the conduct of disciplinary

proceedings against John L. Black in disciplinary proceeding No. F557 was not pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-51-12, (b) at proceeding
No. F-557 did not allege violations of Utah State Bar, Rules of
10
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Professional

Conduct

(1988)

and

(c) that

the

filing

of

the

certificate attached as Exhibit "C" and the Order of Discipline
attached as Exhibit "F" were not pursuant to regulations, customs
and usages of the Utah State Bar.
RESPONSE:
(a)

Admitted,

(b)

Denied.

(c)

Denied.

17.

Admit that the statement in Item 5.2 of the Minutes

attached hereto as Exhibit "Q" to the effect that action on Ethics
Opinion #124 would be deferred "for about 60 days pending receipt
of a related ruling" refers to an anticipated or hoped for ruling
concerning John L. Black.
RESPONSE: This request is denied because Exhibit "Q" is
not as represented in this response but is Ethics Opinion No. 115.
18.

Admit that Defendant Trost and/or Defendant Baldwin

have declined to present the Petition "for . . . sanctions against
Bar Counsel and Assistant Bar Counsel" of John Black dated July 9,
1993 to the Board of Bar Commissioners to whom it was addressed.
RESPONSE: Deny.
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DATED this

<*Q

day of July, 1994.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C

GREGORY J/.I SAUNDERS , ESQ.
Counseir^for Defendant
Stephen A. Trost

12

110

CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. - #1829
GREGORY J. SANDERS, ESQ. - #2858
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN L. BLACK,
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEPHEN A. TROST, NAYER H.
HONARVAR, H. JAMES CLEGG, JOHN
C. BALDWIN, and the UTAH STATE
BAR,

Civil NO. 930905141CV
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the c/Q

day of July, 1994, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant Trost's
Response to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
BAH\BUCK\c£fer sen

(/j.<.hNt—'"

i/?' •* -
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RECEIVED
JUN3 0 1993
OFFICE 0-o>or.n!!N.9pi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH .
ooooo
Regular June Term, 1993

June 29, 1993

In re:

Case No.

920334

Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability

MINUTE ENTRV
Due to the adoption of the new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, effective July l, 1993, it is hereby ordered that all
lawyer

discipline

matters

which

have

been

voted

as

formal

complaints by the screening panels but which have not yet been
heard by the hearing panels shall be removed to the district courts
effective July l, 1993.
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